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NOTE
THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE FCC DECISIONMAKING PROCESS:
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE COURT-AGENCY PARTNERSHIP IN THE
ENTERTAINMENT FORMAT CASES
In recent years, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has increased its input into what has traditionally been the exclusive
substantive policy making function of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC). The FCC is required by the Communications Act. of 1934 1 to
determine whether the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" is served
by the assignment of any broadcast license. 2
 Exercising its exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over FCC licensing decisions, 3
 this activist federal bench has de-
fined for itself a collaborative role with the Commission in formulating ad-
ministrative policy. However, this spirit of collaboration has degenerated into
conflict involving various aspects of broadcast communications regulation. In
the process of interpreting the Communications Act, the D.C. Circuit has de-
fined the public interest in ways which conflict with articulated Commission
policy.' This variance between law and policy as to the substantive content of
the Commission's public interest duties has resulted in a persistent, decade-
long institutional antagonism between the FCC and the D.C. Circuit court.
Judicial encroachment upon FCC discretion to define for itself and
administratively implement its public interest mandate has been justified by
the D.C. Circuit in terms of its partnership doctrine. judge Leventhal first
articulated this concept for the D.C. Circuit by way of influential dicta that, in
his opinion, "agencies and courts together constitute a 'partnership' in fur-
therance of the public interest."' The partnership doctrine represents an
evolving process through which the D.0 Circuit has redefined the institutional
relationship between itself and the agencies which the court oversees. The
court has suggested that this newly redefined judicial function is "one related
to the administrative process—in part supervisory and in part collaborative."
' 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
2
 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
3
 47 U.S.C. § 402(6) (1976).
Compare, e.g., Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 267 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (the public interest in diversity of broadcast entertainment. formats requires
FCC regulation) with Development of Policy Re: Changes in Entertainment. Formats of
Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 863 (1976) (FCC policy statement that public
interest in diversity of entertainment formats is served by policy of free competition).
4
 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (careful judicial attention to FCC procedures, findings
and reasons is required in order to assure court that the agency decision satisfies the
basic requirements of the Rule of Law, as established by Administrative Law Doctrine).
" Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (explana-
tion of the D.C. Circuit court's role in enforcement of Federal Trade Commission
Act). See also Public Serv. Comm'n for the State of New York v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 487 F.2d 1043, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (The Texas Gulf Coast Area Natural
Gas Rate Cases).
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Judicial involvement in the substantive policy-making function of the FCC
is no more apparent than in the line of cases,' heard before the D.C. Circuit,
involving the loss of unique entertainment. formats" from radio broadcast ser-
vice areas. Through these decisions the D.C. Circuit has sought to compel the
Commission to regulate the assignment of radio licenses when it appears that
the diversity" of available entertainment formats will be reduced in the trans-
7 Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (1).C. Cir.
1973); Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 910 (1).C. Cir. 1973): Citizens Conlin.
v. FCC (WGKA), 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
8 The questions of what constitutes an "entertainment format - and a "unique
format" have embroiled the Commission and the D.C. Circuit in a continuing con-
troversy. Compare, e.g., Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d
926, 932 (I).C. Cir. 1973) ("format - is distinct front "occasional duplication of selec-
tions") with Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., 36 F.C.C.2d 650, 652 (1972) (suggestion
that top forty format which included sonic progressive rock music was suitable re-
placement for abandoned progressive rock format); compare also Citizens Comm. to
Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d at 262 (FCC must determine whether format is "unique
or otherwise serves a specialized audience that would feel its loss...) with Entertainment
Formats, 60 F.C.C.2d at 862 (FCC statement that the "elusive qualities" of a station's
programming scent to make all broadcast fOrmats equally unique). For examples of
what constitutes an entertainment format, see Entertainment Formats, 60 F.C.C.2c1 at
880 (Table Z to Appendix B of' Commission's Order lists sub-categories belonging to
major format classifications). The significance of the uniqueness determination is best
understood in relationship with the policy of diversification, explained at note 9 infra.
Simply stated, the loss of a format which could be termed unique would appear to
lessen the goal of maximum diversity of entertainment formats available to the listen-
ing public.
" Diversification remains the most persuasive justification for government regula-
tion of the broadcast industry. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
390, 396-400 (1969). Diversification is the promotion of the maximum number of
speakers in what has been perceived to be a technically scarce telecimamunications
commodity. This first amendment goal has been most carefully elaborated by judge
Learned Hand: "[The first amendment] presupposes that the right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our a11." United States v. Associated Press, 53 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), affd, 326 U.S. 1. (1945). See also Citizens Comm. to Save WEFIsl v. FCC, 506
F.2d at 271 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) ("multitude of tongues" is an irreducible prin-
ciple not subject to verification).
Diversification is also a policy which gives content and form to the public interest
standard and remains an important goal for the FCC in fulfilling its public interest
duties in approving and denying license assignments. Diversification, therefore, can be
justified on both statutory and constitutional gilmnds. Consequently. there has been
considerable controversy regarding the co-extensiveness of the first amendment and
public interest with regard to diversification. See note 16 infra.
It should be noted, however, that recent technological developments in telecom-
munications including microwave and satellite transmissions and cable television will
undoubtedly prompt a rethinking of the goal of diversification, since it presumes scar-
city for its justification. judge Bazelotis concurring opinion in WATCH' Listener's Guild
explicitly mentions the potential impact of these innovations, suggesting that they may
moot the entire question of regulation for diversity: "[T]he dawning technological re-
volution may eliminate this dilemma [of regulating to promote diversity] by opening
up an unprecedented number of accessible outlets for speech.'' kV:\ICN Listener's
Guild v. FCC, 610 1.7 .2d 838, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). See gener-
ally Baer, Telecommunications Technology in the 1980's, in COMMUNICATIONS FOR
July 1980]	 ENTER TittivA f ENT FORA IA Ts	 1069
fen The judicial pronouncements in those cases requiring regulation of enter-
tainment formats conflict directly with Commission policy." To date the
Commission has refused to develop administrative standards in accordance
with the court's decision in the entertainment format cases. Since the re-
sponses of both the D.C. Circuit and the Commission have not varied, and
since neither institution will accommodate the other's views, it is apparent that
any institutional settlement will result from appeal to higher authority."
In an area of institutional conflict between the FCC and the D.C. Circuit
parallelling the entertainment format controversy, the Supreme Court has re-
solved the antagonism by ruling in favor of the FCC. In FCC v. National Citi-
zens Committee fiff Broadcasting (NCCB), 12 the Supreme Court recently over-
turned a D.C. Circuit court decision" which reviewed the Commission's
newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule.14 The Commission's rule sought
to promote diversilicaticm of media ownership by prohibiting the co-location
of certain newspaper-broadcast. combinations within the same service com-
munity. The Commission fashioned its new cross-ownership rule to operate
prospectively, thereby permitting existing combinations to persist in most
broadcast. service areas.' 5 The D.C. Circuit. Court. of Appeals found this use
TOMORROW: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1980's 61 (G. Robinson ed. 1978). See also
WEFM, 506 F.2d 279 n.32 (Bazelon, CT, concurring) (reconsideration of scarcity as-
sumption required by FCC, Congress, and the courts); Brandywine-Main Line Radio,
inc. v. FCC. 473 F.2d 16, 76 (D.C. Cit. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). But see
Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 396 ("scarcity is not entirely a thing of the past.”):
FCC v. NCCH, 4311 U.S. 775 (scarcity rationale reaffirmed).
'" Entertainment Formats, 60 F.C.C.2d 856 (1976). The Commission stated that
regulation to promote diversity of entertainment formats as envisioned by the D.C.
Circuit "would be flatly inconsistent with [FCC's] understanding of congressional policy
as manifested in the Communications Act, counterproductive in terms of maximizing
the welfare of the radio listening public, administratively a fearful and comprehensive
nightmare, and unconstitutional as impermissibly chilling innovation and experimenta-
tion in radio programming. - Id. at 865-66.
" At this writing the Supreme Court has certified this issue for its consideration.
FCC v. WNCN Listener's Guild, cert. granted, 445 U.S. 914 (1980).
' 2
 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
' 3
 National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
14
 FCC rules prohibiting multiple ownership of media sources are codified at 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1979). These recent amendments to the multiple
ownership rules were developed through the agency's notice and comment rulemaking
procedure. 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1974), reconsidered, 53 F.C.C.2d 589 (1975). FCC regula-
tion to promote diversification goes back forty years. In 1941, the Commission enacted
its "chain-broadcasting" rules forbidding the licensing in the same areas of multiple
stations owned by the same network. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 206-07 (1943).
The FCC decisions to promote diversity have been based upon two related prem-
ises, one rooted in antitrust policy and the other in first amendment theory. See note
16 infra. Although the Commission is not empowered to enforce the antitrust laws, the
Supreme Court has noted that it may take cognizance of potential or existing antitrust
violations and antitrust policy in determining the public interest. United States v. RCA,
358 U.S. 334, 351 (1954).
15
 The Commission's decision not to enforce retroactive divestiture of all
newspaper-broadcast combinations across the board was based on its conclusions that
1070	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:1067
of a "grandfather clause," which had the effect of entrenching existing
newspaper-broadcast combinations, to be arbitrary and capricious within the
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. (APA)" since the Commission
articulated no reason to rebut the presumption, raised by cross-ownership,
that such combinations are on their face contrary to the public interest."
On appeal the Supreme Court unanimously held that the means selected
by the Commission to achieve the goal of diversity were not unreasonable,
disruption of the status quo in these instances was unwarranted, since such cross-
owners as a group had "a long record of service" in the public interest. In re Amend-
ment of Sections 73.34, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations (Second Re-
port and Order), 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1078 (1975). The Commission also expressed fear
that local ownership of broadcast outlets would decline. Id. at 1068-69. Consequently,
divestiture was made the exception rather than the rule. The Commission's order re-
quired divestiture only in "egregious cases," i.e., those instances in which the only
broadcast outlet and newspaper co-located in the same service areas were owned by
the same party so as to create an "effective monopoly" of informational sources. Id. at
1049.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 965 (D.C. Cit . .
1977). The court was engaged in construing the meaning of the Act, 5 U.S.C.
706(2)(A) (1976). It should be noted, however, that the FCC based its decision to ban
future combinations upon first amendment grounds only, and to permit existing com-
binations upon first amendment and antitrust policies. 50 F.C.C.2d at 1040. This dis-
tinction is significant in that the Commission's prospective ruling can be justified in
accordance with the first .amenchnent's "faith" in diversification. See note 13 supra.
Based purely upon this stated purpose, the prospective ban can he justified without
evidence of specific abuses by cross owners such as suppression of information and
news distortion. The Commission, the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court are all
in agreement that "diversity and its effect are ... elusive concepts, not easily defined
let alone measured without making qualitative judgments objectionable on both policy
and First Amendment grounds." FCC v. NCCB, 436 U.S. at 796-97 (quoting NCCB,
555 F.2d at 961).
The decision on the part of the Commission to justify its retroactive ban in the
sixteen "egregious" cases of media monopolization on first amendment and antitrust
grounds illuminates a long standing controversy concerning the co•extensiveness of
first amendment values and the public interest mandate. As early as 1943, judge
Learned Hand remarked that the public interest goal of diversity had been "closely
akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment."
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Stipp. 362, 373 (S.D.N.V. 1943), affil, 320 U.S.
1, 23 (1945). Nevertheless, there appears to be a difference of opinion on the Supreme
Court bench concerning the relation between the agency's public interest mandate and
the first amendment. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 142 (1972) (Stewart, j., concurring); id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
id. at 170 n.2 (Brennan, j., dissenting). This same controversy exists on the D.C. Cir-
cuit court bench and establishes the basis for much of judge Bazelon's theoretical dif-
ferences in his concurring opinions in the entertainment format cases. While the
majority opinions are typically written in the form of "statutory review proceedings, -
see, e.g., Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (the
'public interest' standard requires diversification of radio entertainment formats),
judge Bazelon's concurrences are written with primary concern for the first amend-
ment. See id. at 281 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Bazelon also suggests, however, that
the "traditional schema of the First Amendment," i.e., the diversity of tongues, "may
be inadequate in the field of telecommunications," Id. at 273.
17 National Citizens Comm, for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2(1 at 963.
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that the use of a grandfather clause limiting divestiture of broadcast facilities
reflected a rational weighing of competing policies, and as such were not ar-
bitrary use of the agency's discretion." The implications of the Supreme
Court's NCCB decision in the D.C. Circuit court partnership doctrine applied
in the entertainment format cases should not be overlooked. As one author
indicates, the NCCB case superficially appears to be of little import to ad-
ministrative or constitutional law.'" When the case is read in context, how-
ever, the NCCB decision assumes a greater significance.
The NCCB case presents a clear indication of the Supreme Court's efforts
to demarcate the structural boundaries of public interest decisionmaking in
the telecommunications field. By reversing the circuit court's judgment con-
cerning the Commission's order, the Supreme Court pared judicial review of
the agency's decision, permitting it to exercise unfettered discretion. The D.C.
Circuit court challenged the reasonableness of any articulated agency policy
which departed from achieving the maximum diversification of telecommuni-
cations facility ownership. In the process the court of appeals unabashedly
arrogated to itself the power to judge the substantive rulemaking competence of
an independent administrative agency. 2" Due to the fact that the Commission
had not articulated its reasons for applying its cross-ownership rule to future
cases only,' the Supreme Court should not be seen as affirming the rational-
ity of the agency's decision. The NCCB case should be viewed as a message
from the Supreme Court to the D.C. Circuit to modify its pronounced activist
posture in formulating policy for the Commission. 22
' 8
 FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 803. In the con-
text of NCCB, the circuit court would vacate the retroactive aspect of the Commission's
order since it did not promote the policy of maximum diversity. The court of appeals
emphasized the equation of statutory and constitutional concepts in making its case of
arbitrariness and capriciousness. "The 'public interest' standard necessarily invites ref-
erence to First Amendment principles." NCCB, 555 F.2d at 949 (quoting Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 412 U.S. at 122). The circuit court recognized that the first
amendment seeks to further the "search for truth," and reasoned that diversity would
facilitate that search. NCCB, 555 F.2d at 951.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower federal court decision, emphasized that
the Commission's statutory public interest mandate permitted the FCC to make deci-
sions that were "primarily of a judgmental or predictive nature." FCC v. NCCB, 436
U.S. at 813-14. The high court reaffirmed the Commission's legislative "weighing pro-
cess." It concluded that FCC fears of disruption of local broadcast service justifying a
rule limiting divestiture of cross-owned combinations reflected a "rational weighing of
competing policies." In the Court's opinion, the first amendment "faith" in the mul-
titude of tongues did not control, since the Commission's statutory duty permitted the
FCC to consider other factors which would tend to achieve the Commission's "general
goal of 'achieving the best practicable service to the public.'" FCC v. NCCB, 436 U.S.
at 810.
1" Polsby, FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting and the Judicious Uses of
Administrative Discretion, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Polsby].
2" Id. at 2.
21 Amendment to Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership, 50
F.C.C.2d 1046, 1078 (mere recitation of "competing policies" to justify prospective ap-
plication only).
22 Polsby, supra note 19, at 2-3.
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This note is a comprehensive study of the court-agency partnership as
developed in the entertainment format cases. At the outset, the note will
examine the institutional relationship between the FCC and the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals as envisioned by the statutory scheme of the Communica-
tions Act, and how that relationship has been developed under traditional
standards of judicial review. The note will proceed to demonstrate how that
relationship has been unilaterally redefined by the D.C. Circuit court's activist
doctrines. The note will then examine how this expanded judicial function has
affected the entertainment format cases, recite the theoretical basis for that
expansion, and then catalogue the specific instances of conflict between law
and policy in this area. The note will conclude with an analysis of the current
state of the institutional partnership and a prediction for the potential resolu-
tion of this conflict. It will be submitted that the institutional settlement of the
entertainment format controversy will entail Supreme Court enforcement of
agency discretion in these matters, effectively overruling the D.C. Circuit
court's partnership concept." In light of the NCCB decision in particular, it.
is increasingly apparent that the Supreme Court views the FCC as the proper
government. institution to formulate telecommunications policy.
I. THE PARANIETERS OF INSTITUTIONAL DISCRETION
A. The Statutory Scheme
The Communications Act of 1934 grants the FCC broad powers to regu-
late the publicly owned airwaves.24 Congress envisioned the liberal use of
Commission discretion to exercise those powers in fulfilling its public interest.
mandate to "provide for the larger and more effective use of radio." This
discretionary power is critically important_ when the agency is in the process of
making the statutorily required public interest finding. Prior to the grant. of
any license and the approval of license assignments," section 309(b) of the
23 In fact, these very implications of the NCCB case appear to have been recog-
nized by judge l3azelon in his concurring opinion in WNCN Listener's Guild v. FCC,
610 F.2d 838, 858 (D.C. Cit.. 1979). He analyzes the NCCB reversal as a manifestation
by the Supreme Court that the court of appeals decision had not been sufficiently
deferential to the Commission's judgment. Id. at 858-59 n.4.
24 The battery of powers delegated to the Commission runs the full gamut of rem-
edies available to an executive agency: power to impose fines for certain willful viola-
tions of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1976): power to issue cease and desist orders, 47
U.S.C. § 312(b) (1976); power to suspend broadcast license, 47 U.S.C. § 303(111)(i)
(1976); power to revoke broadcast license, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1976). Perhaps the most
persuasive and frequently used power is the authorization in 47 U.S.C. § 303(I) (1976)
to make rules and regulations and to prescribe conditions and restrictions not inconsis-
tent with the law necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act.
25 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1976). The license assignment is made in a non-comparative
proceeding, i.e., no other license applicant can be considered at the time of transfer
other than the proposed transferee. The D.C. Circuit has frequently recognized that
the narrowness of its supervisory function had been purposely designed by Congress
in the statutory scheme of the Communications Act. See, e.g., Hartford Communica-
tions Comm. v. FCC. 467 F.2(1 408, 412 (D.C. Cit.. 1972) ("Congress intended to vest
in the FCC a large discretion to avoid time-consuming hearings in this field whenever
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Act requires that the Commission find any assignment of a broadcast license
to be in the public interest before granting approval to the transfer. 26
The Commission is empowered to authorize a license transfer, exercising
its discretion unilaterally, without a formal public hearing unless "substantial
and material questions of fact" exist at the time of assignment.''- 7 Members of
the listening public may seek to prevent the transfer of a broadcast license by
tiling with the Commission a petition to deny assignment. 28 Petitioners must
specifically allege material facts sufficient for the Commission to find that
there exists a legitimate issue that the public interest is disserved by granting
the license assignment. The procedural requirements of the petition to deny
demand (1) that the petitioner state with specificity allegations of fact, 29 (2)
that he establish a prima facie case that the grant of the license application is
inconsistent with the public interest, 3 " and (3) that substantial and material
questions of fact are present to warrant a hearing prior to the FCC determi-
nation.'"
The formal pleading requirements of the section 309(b) petition to deny
have been strictly enforced by the Commission to discourage frivolous
claims. 32 The legislative history preceding the enactment of section 309 indi-
possible, and we [should] ordinarily defer to that purpose ...." (quoting Southwestern
Operating Co. v, FCC, 351 F.2d 839, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1965))); accord, Citizens Comm. to
Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d at 934 n. 25.
29 47	 § 309(b) (1976).
27 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1976).
28 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1976). Disgruntled members of the listening public, or-
ganized into citizens committees, have been very effective in having their claims recog-
nized by the D.C. Circuit. See generally Schneyer, Overview of Vuhlic Interest Activity in the
Communications Field, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 619-83, for an excellent discussion of the effect
of citizens committees in the communications law field. See also Office of Communica-
tion of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (responsible
representatives of listening public have standing as parties in interest to contest re-
newal of broadcast license). In the area of entertainment format law, citizens groups
have effectively prevented the abandonment of unique program formats from the
radio spectrum by petitioning to deny assignment. See note 7 supra for list of enter-
tainment format cases successfully brought before the D.C. Circuit court. Each of the
entertainment format cases arose in the context of license assignments in circumstances
where, in the process of transferring ownership of the broadcast license, an allegedly
unique program format was to be abandoned and no suitable alternative was to be
provided to the listening public.
Other procedural mechanisms available to the public for drawing alleged in-
adequacies in the broadcast service to the attention of the FCC are: (1) the informal
complaint—generally recognized to be ineffective; and (2) the competing application
for the broadcast license—unrealistic for most citizens groups. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976).
The petition to deny is considered the most cost-effective procedural avenue for lodg-
ing a complaint with the FCC. See generally Note, Judicial Review of FCC Program Diver-
sity Regulation, 75 Comsat. L. RE'. 401, 405-06 (1975).
2 " 47	 § 309(d)(1) (1976).
30 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1976).
31 47	 § 309(d)(2) (1976).
32 See, e.g., In re Corvallis Television Cable Co., 59 F.C.C.2d 1282, 1286 (1976)
(petitioner failed to raise any question of fact which established prima facie case incon-
sistent with the public interest); Nlahoning Valley Broadcasting Corp., 39 F.C.C.2d 52,
63 (1972) (petition to deny dismissed on grounds that petitioner failed to establish
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cates that the procedural obstacles were purposely designed by the Congress
to prevent warrantless demands upon the Commission's time and energies. 33
The Commission has repeatedly denied many petitions by ruling that the
petitioner failed to meet the stringent requirements of the formal petition,
reciting especially failure for lack of specificity and materiality. 34
 Agency dis-
cretion is not unlimited, however. A 1960 amendment to section 309(a) re-
quires that the FCC, upon dismissal of the petition to deny, issue a concise
statement of the reasons for dismissal in order to "furnish [the petitioner]
with an adequate basis for immediate judicial review ...." 35
Section 402(0 of the Communications Act delegates exclusive jurisdiction
over FCC licensing decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit." Section 405 of the Act states that the pro-
cedural standing prerequisites for applying to the court. for judicial remedy
are: a) the petitioner must have been an unsuccessful petitioner for reconsid-
eration of the agency's order, or b) the petitioner must have been a party to
the proceedings. 37
 A petition to reconsider, filed with the Commission after
its denial of the petition to deny, represents the exclusive administrative
remedy and as such is the statutory condition precedent to judicial review of
the merits of the petitioner's claim. 38
 Having exhausted administrative rem-
edies, a petitioner may seek to have the agency's decision reviewed by the
D.C. Circuit to assure that the FCC decision complied with the principles of
administrative law. As noted below, the court's review has become stricter in
recent years, as reflected in the changed standards of review by which it
assesses agency action.
prima facie case of unrepresentativeness of Spanish-speaking persons in ascertainment
survey).
33 H.R. REP. No. 1800, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1960] U.S. Cone
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3520; S. REP. No. 691, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959).
34 See, e.g., Hartford Communications Comm. v. FCC, 467 F.2d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (petitioner's allegations of financial qualifications of license applicant lack
statutorily required specificity); Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 330 (1).C. Cit.. 1972)
(petitioner's allegations held not a proper basis for disapproval of license renewal re-
quest); Marsh v. FCC, 436 F.2d 132, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (petitioner failed to state
facts that might change the result of FCC decision). See also Note. Judicial Review of
FCC Program Diversity Regulation, 75 COLUM. L. Rev. 401, 407 (discussion of the plead-
ing requirements for a petition to deny). The legislative history of 47 U.S.C. § 309, as
amended in 1960, provides a definition of "material question of fact":
For the purpose of sections 309(d) and (e) a material question of fact is a
question of fact which is material to the determination whether the public
interest, convenience, or necessity would be served by the graining of ap-
plication with respect to which such question is raised.
H.R. REP. No. 1800, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1960] U.S. Cone CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 3520.
35
 47 U.S.C.	 309(d)(2) (1960).
36
 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1976).
37
 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1976); but see Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d at 208-11 (substantial
compliance with procedural requirements enforced judicially rather than strict com-
pliance).
38 Joseph, 404 F.2d at 209.
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B. The Changing Standards of Judicial Review
In reviewing FCC licensing decisions, the D.C. Circuit court traditionally
yielded to the Commission's discretion. In general terms, the judicial authority
to review FCC decisions was exercised with a great deal of restraint. The
court merely would examine the administrative record to satisfy itself of the
FCC's procedural compliance with principles of administrative law in its
decisionmaking process. 3" The court was satisfied that the Commission was
performing its administrative duty if it determined that the FCC had made a
rational decision based on all of the available facts. The D.C. Circuit deferred
to the Commission's expertise" and afforded the agency a presumption of
regularity to its proceedings. 4 ' In addition, the court upheld the Commis-
sion's decisions when its reasons were articulated with sufficient clarity, 42 or
when the Commission's decisions turned on "inferences to be drawn from
facts already known and the legal conclusions to be derived from those
facts.""
In the past ten years, however, the D.C. Circuit has developed an ap-
proach that has been progressively less deferential and more judicially expan-
sive in reviewing FCC matters. Two concepts—the hard look doctrine" and
the court-agency partnership concept 45 —represent marked departures from
the traditional judicial view of the relationship between the D.C. Circuit and
3" See note 5 supra. The precise standard of judicial review of agency discretion is
the "palpably improper" standard. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. to Save WGKA, 436 F.2d
at 268 (that the Commission has a discretion in licensing matters "which will not be
disturbed unless it is palpably abused" is "a general truth which needs no demonstra-
tion").
4" Marsh v. FCC, 436 F.2d 132, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
4 ' See, e.g., WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
42 See, e.g., West Michigan Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.2d, 883, 891 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
43
 Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
44
 The D.C. Circuit's hard look doctrine represents a judicial assertion of its com-
petence to determine from the administrative record whether the Commission had
engaged in rational decisionmaking. Under this doctrine, an agency is required, before
the exercise of its administrative discretion, to "inform that discretion as accurately as
possible by reliable facts relevant to that exercise." See Greater Boston Television
Corp., v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970). "The function of the court is to assure
that the agency has given reasoned consideration to all the material facts and issues."
Id. at 851. See also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968). In addi-
tion, the agency is required to set out in the record its reasons for deciding the case.
See Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d 841 (the hard look doctrine "calls for
insistence that the agency articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and
identify the significance of the crucial facts."). Id. at 851.
45
 The partnership concept appears to be the D.C. Circuit court's justification for
intrusion upon the substantive policy-making function of the FCC. Under this doc-
trine, the circuit court envisions an ongoing joint venture in the furtherance of the
public interest. The D.C. Circuit has announced that the FCC and the court are "col-
laborative instrumentalities of justice." Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851-
52.
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the regulatory agencies which it supervises. The hard look doctrine was first
applied in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC." Under the hard look doc-
trine, the court asserts its competence "to probe the mind of the adminis-
trator" in order to satisfy itself that the Commission's decision had been based
on a thorough consideration of all the relevant factors"' and, thereby, to in-
sure that the agency engaged in reasoned decisionmaking. 48
 One of the pur-
poses of the doctrine is to pierce the strict pleading requirements established
by the section 309(b) petition to deny in order to compel the FCC to make a
broader investigation of the facts. 4" The court will remand the Commission's
licensing decision for an evidentiary hearing" when it perceives fil.n "a com-
bination of danger signals"' that the Commission used the procedural bar-
riers of the section 309 pleading requirements to avoid the substantive issues
raised by the petitioner. The hard look doctrine represents a judicial assertion
of power based on the requirements of procedural fairness; the D.C. Circuit.
sets aside the Commission's actions on the grounds that a danger signal indi-
cates that "an impermissible factor ... entered the decision or a crucial factor
had not been considered." 52
 Nevertheless, the opportunity for judicial abuse
of this doctrine is evident once one realizes that the determination of exactly
what signals are dangerous is made by the court and is governed wholly by its
perceptions of inadequacies in the record."
The partnership doctrine, by contrast, goes beyond merely assuring pro-
cedural regularity and represents an assertion of judicial power in the forma-
tion of substantive administrative policy. Again, this concept sprang from the
4"
 444 F.2d at 851. The court concluded that its supervisory function calls on the
court to intervene if it becomes aware that the "agency has not really taken a 'hard
look' at the salient problems." See also WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1156-57
(1).C. Cir. 1969), affil,, 459 F.2d 1203, 1210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027
(1972).
47 See WAI7' Radio, 418 F.2d at 1156.
4n
 Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851. The hard look doctrine is "a
course that tends to assure that the agency's policies effectuate general standards.
applied without unreasonable discrimination. -
 Id.
4" See text and notes at notes 28-35 supra.
5" The practical effect of a D.C. Circuit remand to the Commission is to compel a
pre-trial settlement between the petitioning citizens golly and the broadcast licensee.
See WNCN Listener's Guild, 610 F.2d at 848-49 (discussion of history of settlement in
entertainment format cases).
5L
 Joseph v. FCC. 404 F.2d 207, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
" Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
53
 See Note, Judicial Review qf.
 FCC Program Diversity Regulation, 75 Comm, L. lbw.
401, 408; compare WAIT Radio, 418 F.2d at 1160 (danger signals found in FCC per-
functory dismissal of application for waiver of FCC rule even though application con-
tained allegations stated with clarity and supported by data), with Joseph v. FCC, 404
F.2d at 212 (danger signal found in FCC's approval without hearing of an assignment
of radio station to an assignee who was the owner of major newspaper in the service
area). Also compare Citizens Comm. v. FCC (WGKA), 436 F.2d at 270 (hard look re-
quired when FCC made flat assumption as to unique radio format's unprofitability
its approval of license assignment without hearing), with Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d at 863 (no danger signals found due to the FCC's extensive
decisioitmaking processes).
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fertile dicta in Greater Boston Television Corp., in which the D.C. Circuit asserted
that "agencies and courts together constitute a 'partnership' in furtherance of
the public interest, and are 'collaborative instrumentalities of justice.' "54 The
court envisioned this newly defined relationship with the agencies as a new
departure from its formerly deferential role when it stated:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the
long and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and review-
ing courts. For many years, courts have treated administrative policy
decisions with great deference, confining judicial attention primarily
to matters of procedure. On matters of substance, the courts regu-
larly upheld agency action, with a nod in the direction of the "sub-
stantial evidence" test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative
expertise. Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised, the
power to set aside agency action on the ground that an impermissi-
ble factor had entered into the decision, or that a crucial factor had
not been considered. Gradually, however, that power has come into
more frequent use, and with it, the requirement that administrators
articulate the factors on which they base their decisions.'
The scope of review of administrative decisions thus has evolved to a point
where the judicial scan represents a thoroughly "hard look." This high inten-
sity judicial supervision monitors administrative discretion in an effort to en-
sure rational decisionmaking.
Analytically, the hard look and partnership doctrines do not appear to be
dissimilar. Under the partnership concept, the court appears to be exercising
a right which it had asserted all along: to review the record to determine
whether the agency's decision was based on a thorough consideration of all
crucial factors without the inclusion of impermissible factors. But. language
suggesting that the court and the Commission are joined in a "responsible
partnership in the public interest" 56 is ambiguous. Such language indicates
a discernible shift in the attitude of the court. It is submitted that this lan-
guage reveals a willingness by the court to forego its conventional, judicial
function based in the common law and the Administrative Procedure Act.,
Partnership language which claims that the court "is in a real sense part of the
total administrative process" 57
 creates the intellectual grounds upon which the
court may exceed the mere supervisory function of ascertaining consistency
with law and legislative mandate and require the administrative enforcement.
of substantive policies at great expense to agency discretion.
The entertainment format cases 58
 illustrate how the partnership concept.
has resulted in a perceptible shift from the traditional standard of judicial
54 444 12.2d at 851-52. See also Polsby, supra note 19, at 15-16 n.38, for a discussion
of the origins of the court-agency partnership concept.
The D.C. Circuit court has spoken of the court-agency partnership in other
agency contexts. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
at 597.
5"
 Public Service Contin'n., State of N.Y. v. FPC, 487 F.2d 1043, 1067 (D.C. Cit.
1973).
57
 Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 852.
58 See cases cited in note 7 supra.
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restraint.''' The D.C. Circuit has expressed a willingness to remand FCC
licensing decisions for procedural flaws which have not been deducible from
any prohibition in the Communications Act, but rather are deemed to be of-
fensive to judicial notions of fairness." The entertainment format cases
imply that the D.C. Circuit is willing to go even further to require FCC en-
forcement of substantive policies which the court claims are mandated by the
Communications Act.
II. CATALOG OF CONFLICT: "LAW" AND "POLICY"
IN THE ENTERTAINMENT FORMAT CASES
The controversy between the FCC and the D.C. Circuit court centers
around the unresolved issue of how to best maximize diversity of entertain-
ment programming. The ideological conflict focuses upon the means to
achieve the desired goal of "diversification"—the FCC believing that competi-
tive market forces produce sufficient variety and the D.C. Circuit insisting
upon government regulation to prevent a reduction of diversity.
A. Articulation of Entertainment Format Law
Procedurally, each of the entertainment format cases came before the
D.C. Circuit court on appeal from an FCC decision to approve assignment of
a radio broadcast license and deny to the appellant citizens committees
(petitioners below) their request. for an evidentiary hearing on alleged factual
disputes relevant to the transfer."' The substance of the appellants' argu-
ment in each of these cases was that the public interest had not been served
by the license assignment, since in the process of transfer a unique entertain-
ment format was abandoned," 2 thereby lessening diversity.
5 " The partnership concept pervades the collaborative dialogue between the D.C.
Circuit and the FCC in these cases. The WEFM decision, 506 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir.
1979) made the message explicit to the Commission that there was no way to reconcile
the law of entertainment formats with its own policies. The WEFM court indicated
how it perceived the institutional partnership and how it should be managed. In the
Commission's view, "when such partners conic to a point of fundamental disagree-
ment, it is incumbent upon us to lake a step back and rethink our entire position if
this relationship is to be creative rather than destructive." Policy Statement on Enter-
tainment Formats, 60 F.C.C.2d at 865. The D.C. Circuit replied that the "proper rela-
tionship between court and agency" was not a partnership between equals. "We should
have thought that WEFM represents, not a policy but rather the law of the land ...."
14 1NCN Listener's Guild, 610 F.2d at 854 (original emphasis). Clearly in the joint venture
in the public interest, the D.C. Circuit has awarded itself the role of senior managing
partner.
"" See, e.g., Citizens Comm. to Save WEEVI v. FCC, 506 F.2c1 at 265-66 (failure of
FCC to assign burden of proof' regarding radio station's Financial situation to party
with access to relevant information, viz. license assignor, is fundamentally unfair);
WNCN Listener's.
 Guild, G10 F.2d at 846 (FCC failure to disclose important technical
document for public comment raised question of procedural fairness to parties op-
posed to it.)
See note 30 supra for a discussion of the role played by citizens committees in
FCC public interest litigation and the standing of representatives of the listening public
to contest licensing decisions in federal courts.
"' Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (assign-
ment of radio license entailed the abandonment of only classical format in Chicago);
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1. Citizens Committee to Save WGKA v. FCC: The Public's Paramount Right and
the Commission's Affirmative Duty
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals first indicated its concern over the
agency's licensing decisions that involved questions of entertainment format
diversity in Citizens Committee to Save the 'Voice of the Arts in Atlanta' v. FCC. 63
 In
March 1968, Strauss Broadcasting Company of Atlanta sought approval from
the FCC for transfer of the operating rights of the Atlanta radio stations
WGKA-AM and WGKA-FM." 4
 Strauss had anticipated the transfer of stock
ownership of the radio stations from Glenkaren Associates, Inc." Glenkaren,
the proposed assignor of the radio license, had maintained.the only classical
music format in Atlanta for many years. Strauss' proposed program format
consisted of a "blend of popular favorites, Broadway hits, musical standards,
and light classics." 16
 Publication of the proposed transfer provoked a
groundswell of public disapproval. In September 1968, the Commission
granted the transfer application without a hearing, finding that the financial
situation of the assignor, Glenkaren, necessitated the assignment.''' The
Commission stated in its conclusion that the community surveys conducted by
Strauss established that the public interest would be served by the proposed
programming and that the informal objections of the listening public raised
no substantial question requiring a hearing."
Appellant Citizens Committee filed with the Commission a petition for
reconsideration of the agency's decision in response to the Citizens Commit-
tee's challenge to the community surveys conducted by Strauss." The Com-
mission requested Strauss " 'to ascertain by a more comprehensive survey'
[than the original ascertainment survey] the tastes and needs of the commu-
nity." 7°
 This statistical survey of program preferences" in the listening area
indicated that while 73% of those interviewed preferred the popular favorites
programming proposed by Strauss, 16% of the public preferred the retention
of the classical music format to be abandoned in the transfer." Using these
Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (as-
signment of radio license entailed abandonment of the only progressive rock format in
Toledo); Lakewood Broadcasting Serv. Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(petitioners allege abandonment of the only "all news" radio format in Deliver met-
ropolitan area); Citizens Comm. to Save the 'Voice of the Arts in Atlanta' v. FCC
(WGKA), 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (assignment of radio license entailed change of
program format abandoning the only classical radio station in Atlanta).
"3
 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"4
 Citizens Comm. to Preserve the 'Voice of the Arts in Atlanta' v. FCC, (WGKA),
436 F.2d 263, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
" 5 Id.
" Id.
"7 Id. at 266.
68 Id .
lift Id .
7 ° Id. at 267.
" The Commission's request for empirical data came after a series of allegations
and counter-allegations between the petitioner and the proposed assignee concerning
the public's preferences in program formats. Id. at 266-67.
72 Id. at 267.
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figures, supplied to the Commission by the assignee Strauss, the Commission
concluded that "[t]tle case here comes down to a choice of program
formats—a choice which in the circumstances is one for the judgment. of the
licensee.""
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit in Citizens Committee to Preserve the 'Voice of the
Arts in Atlanta', WGKA-AM and WGKA-FM v. FCC (hereinafter WGKA)" held
that the procedural requirements of the Communications Act call for more
detailed evidence than that on which the Commission had based its conclu-
sions, and remanded the decisions back to the FCC for an evidentiary hear-
ing." The WGKA court rejected the Commission's numerical majority argu-
ment that since only 16% of the residents of Atlanta preferred classical music,
the public interest would unquestionably he served if the programming pro-
posed suited the tastes of a larger number of listeners. In its most important
language, the court elaborated on the theme of the public's paramount right
to diverse entertainment formats:
In a democracy like ours [the numerical majority argument]
might, of course, make perfect sense if there were only one radio
channel available to Atlanta. Its rationality becomes less plain when it
is remembered that there are some 20 such channels, all owned by
the public as a whole, classics lovers and rock enthusiasts alike. The
'public interest, convenience and necessity' can be served in the one
case in a way that it cannot be in the other, since it is surely in the
public interest, as that was conceived of by a Congress representative of all
the people, for all major aspects of contemporary culture to be accommodated
by the commonly owned public resources whenever that is technically and
economically feasible.'"
The court broadly construed the public interest to include a concern for
diverse entertainment formats. The scope of the "public interest" standard
included the public right to the broadest possible range of entertainment
formats. The Court insisted that the FCC factor these new rights into the
ultimate public interest determination.
The WGKA court recognized a public right to diverse entertainment for-
mats which had eluded the Commission's analysis of the public interest when
approving the transfer of operating rights to Strauss. The WGKA court found
the Commission's approach untenable and required it to re-study the various
interests involved through "the Congressional requirement. of a hearing."'"
The court framed the factual issues in controversy to be resolved in the
evidentiary hearing upon remand: the financial viability of the assignor,"" the
accuracy of Strauss' preference surveys,'" and the availability of an alternative
program source." The key aspect of the WGKA opinion was the court's rec-
7 " Id. Glen Karen Associates, Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 13 (1969).
74 436 F.2c1 263 (D.C. Cir. 197(1).
Id. at 272.
7 " Id. at 269 (emphasis supplied).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 269-70.
79 Id. at 270-71.
"" Id. at 271-72.
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ognition of a new public right in diversity which had to be considered by the
Commission in future cases. The assertion of this articulated public right
clashed headlong with the Commission's existing policy,"' a policy which was
reflected in its conclusion that the choice of program formats is one best left
to the licensee's judgment.
The public interest in diverse programming was described by the court as
the public's paramount right, a right superior to the private interests of the
broadcast companies party to the license assignment. The law as laid down in
WGKA thus attempted to compel the Commission to subordinate the
broadcaster's economic interests to the public's paramount right in those in-
stances where the marketplace had broken down and tended to constrict the
available selection of entertainment formats rather than foster their diversity.
The broadcaster's first amendment right of free speech, 82 given great defer-
ence by Commission policy, was deemed by the WGKA court to be less worthy
of protection than the competing public interest right. of listeners.'" Twice in
the WGKA opinion the court suggested that the Commission had derogated
the public's interest by promoting merely the private economic interests of the
broadcasters. The court made particular mention of Strauss' statement in the
first amendment to its application for license assignment. In that. amendment.
Strauss commented that "Nhere has not been any general acceptance by the
public or commercial advertisers of classical music"" to support its proposed
change in format. In commenting on the nature of the Commission's duty in
81 Commission policy regarding programming had not been extended beyond the
non-entertainment, informational aspects of a broadcaster's format. The only FCC
regulations implemented to ensure that the broadcaster's programming was responsive
to the community entailed the ascertainment process. See notes 103 & 104 infra and
accompanying text. The broadcast licensee has been given, in great Illeatilire, the re-
sponsibility for programming to meet the needs and interests of the public and his
honest and prudent judgment will be accorded great weight by the Commission." See
Report and Statement of Policy re: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry, 25
Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960). Commission policy assumed that no businessman, including
broadcasters, could possibly succeed in business without responding to the public's
wants and needs. Yet the duties of the license applicant in the ascertainment process
do not require canvassing the public as to their program preferences, but merely re-
quire the determination of community problems. Id. In addition, the broadcaster is not
required to note the frequency of responses by the sample to a particular problem, nor
the intensity of those responses. See generally Note, judicial Review of FCC Programming
Diversity Regulation, 75 COLUM. L. REv. at 402-19. In essence, the ascertainment pro-
cess, as conceived by Commission policy, required identification and not quantification
of the community response to problems.
82 As judge Bazelon pointed out in his concurrence in WEFAI: "There can be little
doubt at this late date that artistic or entertainment programming is within the scope
of the First Amendment." WEI"M, 506 F.2d at 271 n.9 (Bazelon, C.j., concurring)
(citing Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957)).
83 The D.C. Circuit appeared to be operating within the bounds of the broad dic-
tum of the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co, v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1979).
In Red Lion, the Supreme Court arranged the order of competing first amendment.
claims by stating: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of broad-
casters, which is paramount." Id. at 390.
84 436 F.2d at 266 (emphasis in original).
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making its public interest finding the court stated: "The Commission's
judgmental function does not end simply upon a showing that a numerical
majority prefer the Beatles to Beethoven, impressive as that fact may be in the
eyes of the advertisers." 85
The D.C. Circuit appears to have made two points through these re-
marks. First, in the court's view, broadcasters tend to program not in response
to public preferences, but in response to advertising dollars. Reliance upon
the business judgment of a broadcaster in the face of widespread public dis-
satisfaction to a proposed format change tends to emphasize the economic
interests of the broadcasters and their advertisers to the detriment of an ex-
pressed public preference and in derogation of a public right. Second, the
exercise of the Commission's duty to promote the public interest requires it to
make more than rough judgments as to how a license assignment serves that
interest. In the WGKA court's view, the Commission is statutorily required to
promote the interests of a minority of the listening public when they consti-
tute a "not insignificant" portion of the service area "whenever that is techni-
cally and economically feasible.'
The WGKA court closely examined the Commission's reasoning through
the reviewing lens of the hard look doctrine." The court found that
the Commission had exercised its discretion without considering all the crucial
factors" relevant to the exercise of that discretion. The Commission's original
order approving the license assignment in WGKA had been held without a
hearing because the Commission believed that there existed no substantial and
material questions of fact bearing significantly upon the exercise of its judg-
ment. 8" In its initial order the Commission had recited as fact that the
unprofitability of the assignor's broadcast operation created the financial
necessity for the transfer without any supporting factual references." The
parties to the assignment had submitted financial reports which indicated that
station expenditures had exceeded its revenues for six years prior to the
transfer."' The appellant. Citizens Committee argued successfully to the D.C.
Circuit that such a financial analysis was not the proper measure of profitabil-
ity. The appellant alleged that certain large capital expenditures for the im-
provement of the station's broadcast facilities had caused the financial reports
85 Id. at 2(19.
" Id.
87 Id. at 270.
" The court was unpersuaded by the rationality of the Commission's public M-
wrest determination for several reasons. First, the Commission's assumption concern-
ing the financial necessity of transferring Glenkaren's license "appears in the Commis-
sion's initial order without any supporting factual references." WGKA, 436 F.2d at 269.
Second, the controversy surrounding the accuracy of Strauss' preference surveys is
precisely the type of situation "which motivated the Congress to stress the availability
to the Commission of the hearing procedure." Id. at 271. Finally, the availability of an
alternative source for the abandoned format is a factor "which would be highly rele-
vant to a reasoned disposition" of the public interest issue, and "it is obviously impor-
tant that this dispute of fact be explored and resolved." Id. al 271-72.
" Glen Karen Associates, Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 13 ([969).
"" WGKA, 436 F.2d at 209.
"E Id.
July 1980]	 ENTERTAINMENT FORMATS 	 1083
to reflect a distorted picture of the station's financial situation." 2 The court
in WGKA indicated that the financial viability of a station's format was an
important factor to be considered by the Commission in determining whether
retention of the endangered unique format was economically feasible." The
WGKA court stated, however, that it did not pretend to know what the actual
financial situation of the assignor was, or what the remanded record would
reveal upon hearing, The court's decision to remand was based upon "the
Commission's flat assumption" as to the unprofitability of the station's opera-
tion which required the closer look of a formal evidentiary hearing." 4
The WGKA court then determined that a separate procedural defect in
the record constituted independent grounds for remand. In upholding its
original order approving assignment, the Commission stated that a substitute
station existed which provided substantially the same classical format as that
abandoned by WGKA.''' In response to this statement, the appellant Citizens
Committee made a factual allegation to the Commission that the substitute's
signal "reached kw Atlanta listeners at an acceptable level of signal qual-
ity."" At oral argument before the D.C. Circuit none of the parties to the
WGKA case—the Citizens Committee, Strauss Broadcasting, or the former sta-
tion owner, Gienkaren Associates, Inc.—were familiar with the contour charts
"which would be highly relevant to a reasoned disposition of this ques-
tion."' The WGKA court went on to conclude that: "Since the Commission
appears to justify its action in some considerable part by the asserted availabil-
ity to Atlanta listeners of at least a daytime classical format, it is obviously
important that this dispute of fact be explored and resolved." 8
In WGKA the court established two important principles which would be
developed more fully in the later entertainment format cases.`° First, the
"2 Id. at 269-70.
93 id .
"' Id. at 270.
hl. at 271. The Commission accepted the Strauss assertion that a daytime-only,
500-watt classical station in Decatur, Georgia (WONIN), 10 miles out of Atlanta,
adequately served the needs of WGKA's former audience. The Commission's order
recites that WONIN serves a "large portion of the city of Atlanta." Id.
"" Id. at 267.
'' 7
 Id. at 271.
" Id. at 271-72.
These two principles had been foreshadowed in Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207
(D.C. Cir. 1968). First, although Joseph is not an entertainment format case, it dem-
onstrates the extent to which the reviewing court will invalidate a Commission order
which rejects a citizen's petition to deny assignment for mere technical pleading errors.
The Joseph court emphasized that it rejected the need for mechanical compliance, with
the prerequisites for judicial review, id. at 210, and would look with leniency upon a
citizen's claim which, though formally incorrect, had substanially complied with the
requirements for review. Id. The court made no effort to disguise its protective at-
titude towards claims from members of the public. It stressed that the appellant was a
representative of the listening public and as such did not have the same sort of
Washington representation to uncover threats to their interests, or to display apparatus
us combat them, as do parties whose interests are economic." Id. The court thereby
heightened the role of the listening public in the Commission's license assignment de-
cisionmaking process, expressing a distinct bias towards protecting the public's
paramount right.
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D.C. Circuit established conclusively the paramount right of the listening pub-
lic to a diversity of entertainment formats. Relying on its interpretation of the
Communications Act. of 1934, the WGKA court stated that the public interest
is served only when maximum diversity is promoted "whenever that. is techni-
cally and economically feasible." 100 Second, the nature of the Commission's
duty in deciding whether an assignment of a radio license would be in the
public interest had been greatly broadened. The WGKA court found in the
Commission's failure to seriously investigate the financial viability of the assig-
nor's operations or the availability of an alternative source for the abandoned
format a sufficient justification to remand the administrative record For an
evidentiary hearing. In hard look doctrine terms, the court found that the
"crucial factors" had not been considered by the Conunission before issuing its
approval order.'" Although justified on procedural grounds, the remand
carried with it the first murmurs of an independently conceived set of sub-
stantive criteria to be implemented by the Commission in making its public
interest finding.
The preference survey submitted by the proposed assignee Strauss
Broadcasting to substantiate its application created another potential conflict
between policy and law in the entertainment format cases. The Citizens
Committee urged in its amendments to its petition for reconsideration that
Strauss had misrepresented the support for the proposed format change in its
original ascertainment survey of thirteen community leaders. The Committee
atached to its amendments affadavits of six of the interviewees which con-
tradicted the summaries of the interviews submitted by Strauss. In passing on
the materiality of this alleged misrepresentation, the D.C. Circuit. implicitly
reviewed the Commission's programming policy. The Commission's pro-
gramming policy as articulated in the Commission's En Banc Programming
Inquiry 102
 and its Primer on Ascertainment' requires the broadcast appli-
Second, the Joseph court defined the nature and depth of the Commission's inquiry
when making its public interest finding. The court interpreted the Communications
Act to impose upon the Commission an affirmative duty to designate an assignment
decision for a public hearing if' the petition to deny raises "a substantial and material
question of fact or if the Commission is unable for any reason' to find that the public
interest is served by granting the assignment. Id. at 211. From this language, the court
created an independent duty of factual investigation to be made by the FCC during its
licensing decisions. The nature of this duty was later elaborated in WEFAI, 506 F.2d at
262 n.21. "Even in the absence of intervention (by public protestants), the FCC is
obliged to be certain it is not dealing with a formal change affected with the public
interest ...." Id.
um 436 F.2d at 209.
1 °' The WGKA court agreed that the Commission has discretion regarding the exis-
tence of material and substantial questions of' fact which bear on the Commission's
judgment and which ought not to be disturbed "unless it is palpably abused." Id. at
268. Nevertheless, the court went on to state that the Commission's bare assertion did
not answer the question of whether that discretion in this particular case was required,
prior to its exercise, to be informed as accurately as possible by reliable facts relevant
to that exercise. Id. at 268-69.
"' 25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960) (entertainment format is a matter best left to the dis-
cretion of the licensee). See also note 72 supra and accompanying text.
a°3 See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).
July 1980]	 ENTERTAINMENT FORMATS 	 1085
cant to conduct interviews with representatives in the service area to determine
community problems.'" Explicitly rejected in the Primer was the notion that
the Commission required the applicant to determine the community's pro-
gram preferences." 3
 There appeared to be a manifest contradiction between
the D.C. Circuit and the Commission as to what the agency's policy ought to
be regarding the determination of the public's program preferences. The
Commission required no inquiry as to the preferences in any case, defining
the nature of the broadcaster's public interest duty in terms of responding to
community problems. The D.C. Circuit, however, would have given weight to
any proffered empirical evidence demonstrating the listening public's prefer-
ences in those cases involving the abandonment of a unique entertainment
format.
The WGKA court did not determine whether a preference survey was
required in these instances, thereby avoiding direct conflict with articulated
Commission policy. The court side-stepped the potential conflict in its opin-
ion: "We are not disposed, at. least on this record, to attribute [actual misrep-
resentation] to intervenor, or to permit appellant's allegations in this regard to
play a part in the conclusions we reach as to the proper disposition of this
appeal."'" The court suggested that the factual variance may have been due
to the confusion and misunderstanding "inherent in a process in which the
statements and opinions of one individual are sought to be determined from
what two adversary parties say that he said or thinks." 1 D 7 Rather than ascribe
actual misrepresentation as the purpose of the assignee Strauss, the court re-
manded the issue of preferences, along with the issues of financial viability
and alternative sources, for resolution "in the crucible of an evidentiary hear-
ing."'" Thus, the court created confusion as to the role of preference sur-
veys in making licensing decisions.'" The obscurity of the court's opinion
served, predictably, to generate future litigation which centered on this issue.
104 Id. at 66 - 71. See also Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast
Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d 418 (1976) (ascertainment required to be continuous). Two
basic areas of controversy surrounding the ascertainment process requirement should
he noted. First, ascertainment is essentially procedural, i.e. the Commission has come
to rely upon the efficacy of the process of ascertainment to the point where the FCC
assumes that it guarantees rather than merely f(isters responsiveness to the community
and its problems. For a more compicte analysis of the difficulties encountered by a
petitioner in arguing the unresponsiveness of a broadcaster's programming to com-
munity problems, see Note, Judicial Review of FCC Programming Diversity Regulation, 75
COLUNI. L. REV. at 402-19. Second, the purpose of the ascertainment procedure is to
determine community problems, not preferences as to program content or formats. As
explained in the text, infra, this limited function of the procedural duties of the broad-
cast licensee has created anomalies and confusion in the entertainment format cases.
27 F.C.C.2d at 656-57.
''' 436 F.2d at 271.
107
105 hi .
"" In Hartford Communications Comm. v. FCC, 467 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
decided two years after the WGKA case, the court founcl that the assignee had made a
reasonable and good faith effort to ascertain the needs and interests of the community
in accordance with the Commission's Primer on the Ascertainment of Community
Problems by Broadcast Applicants and had made no misrepresentations in that regard. Id. at
411. Although the Hartford Communications court did not intimate what might consti-
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2. Lakewood Broadcasting Service, Inc. v. FCC: The Tentative Accommodations
The FCC had not acted upon the court's suggestion in WGKA to formu-
late standards for judging the effects of entertainment format diversity.
Shortly after its decision in WGKA, the court was confronted by a similar suit
brought by members of the listening public who alleged loss of a unique for-
mat incident to a transfer of radio licenses. The facts presented in Lakewood
Broadcasting Service, Inc. v. FCC''" were quite similar to those in WGKA; the
procedure by which the case came before the D.C. Circuit court was identical.
In 1971 executors of the deceased owner of KBTR (AM) Radio Station had
contracted to sell the all news" station to Mission Denver Company. 111
lion Denver, the proposed license assignee, had indicated in its assignment.
application before the Commission a desire to change KBTR (AM)'s format to
a country and western music format." 2 Announcement of this proposed
change engendered petitions to deny from Lakewood Broadcasting Service,
Inc., another country and western Denver station and primary competitor of
the altered KBTR (AM) music format, and Colorado Citizens for Broadcast-
ing, a public interest citizens group. The petitioners jointly sought a hearing
on the public interest ramifications of abandoning the unique, all news for-
mat, and Lakewood additionally challenged the financial qualifications of Mis-
sion Denver, the proposed assignee." 3 The Commission found that a hear-
ing was not required" 4 and determined that the public interest would best be
served by granting the assignment. application,'" On appeal, the D.C. Circuit.
affirmed the Commission's determination that no material and substantial
questions of fact were presented by the petitioners, thereby permitting the
tute a material misrepresentation, it did indicate the relationship between such misrep-
resentation and the need for a public bearing. The court stated: "Even where there
arc factual disputes, there is no automatic hearing requirement, for '[c]ontradictory
allegations and affadivits which create some possibly unresolved Factual issue do not
invariably necessitate an evidentiary hearing before the Commission can judge whether
an assignment would be in the public interest. - Id. at 411-12 (quoting Broadcast En-
terprises, Inc. v. FCC, 390 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). The Hartford Communica-
tions court further elaborated the materiality requirement by quoting from its own
analysis in another recent case. "[Al hearing is not required to resolve issues which the
Commission finds are either not 'substantial' or 'material', regardless of whether the
facts involved are in dispute." Id. at 412 (quoting Slone v. FCC, 466 12 .2cl 316. 322
(I).C. Cir. 1972)). In the final analysis, the court concluded that the determination as
to whether the factual issues are substantial and material depends on whether "the
relevant facts were adequately presented" to the Commission and whether anything
properly before the Commission suggests "that a further hearing would produce addi-
tional facts that might change the result. - Id. Accord, Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
324 F.2d 402, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963). See also Marsh v. FCC, 436 1 7 .2cl 132, 135-36 (I).C.
Cir. 1970).
110
 478 F.24 919 (D.C:. Cir. 1973).
Ill Id. at 921-22.
"2 Id. at 922.
' 13 Id.
'" Charles A. Haskell, 36 F.C.C.2d 78, 86 (1972). The Commission's opinion rep-
resented what the D.C. Circuit court termed "a painstakingly thorough decision,"
Lakewood Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d at 922.
"5
 36 F.C.C.2d at 88.
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Commission to decide the case without an evidentiary hearing.'" The
Lakewood court agreed with the Commission's conclusion that the public in-
terest would be served by granting the application and found that the Com-
mission had engaged in rational decisionmaking in reaching that conclu-
sion)' 7
In deciding Lakewood, the D.C. Circuit clarified the issue of material mis-
representation. The appellant Citizens Committee (petitioner below) claimed
that the interview summaries submitted to the Commission with the assignee's
application for license transfer were defective."" The Committee alleged
that the interviewees were not informed of the proposed format change inci-
dent to the assignment, and, therefore, the applicant had misrepresented the
nature and purpose of the interview.'" The Committee petitioned the court
to remand the record for an evidentiary hearing since such actions raised
factual questions concerning the adequacy and accuracy of the proffered as-
certainment data) ." The Lakewood court agreed with the Commission that
the Committee's allegation of misrepresentation was immaterial to the Com-
mission's decision, since it had resulted from a "persistent 'misreading of the
purpose of ascertainment procedures.' " 121
 Before proceeding to distinguish
WGKA, the D.C. Circuit spoke in one voice with the Commission as to the
correctness of the agency's programming policy procedures: "Clearly the
Primer elucidates that the ascertainment procedures are meant to determine
the problems of the community, e.g., drug abuse, pollution, race relations,
crime, as opposed to the programming preferences of the interviewees." 122
The Lakewood court distinguished WGKA on the material misrepresenta-
tion issue. The court observed that the summaries submitted by the applicant
in WGKA were expressly designed to bolster the applicant's assertion that
there had been no widespread public preference for the abandoned for-
niat.' 23
 Preferences were at issue in WGKA, and, to the extent that the sum-
maries did not accurately reflect those preferences, the materiality of the mis-
representations was manifest.' 24
 Adopting the logic of the Commission in its
license decision, the Lakewood court continued: "In the situation sub judice,
however, statements of preference simply are not relevant to the ascertain-
ment survey as presently constituted, and so the Commission's conclusion that
the alleged misrepresentations regarding format preferences do not raise
material issues of fact cannot be faulted." 125 Thus, WGKA and Lakewood, in
combination, set forth the D.C. Circuit's views on the issue of misrepresenta-
tion. The court summarized its position in a footnote in Lakewood:
Thus the absence of any references to preference in the ascertain-
ment survey cannot be considered a misrepresentation. If the format
"" 478 F.2d at 925.
" 7 Id.
"8 Id. at 923.
Hy Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting Charles A. Haskell, 36 F.C.C.2d at 84-85 (1972)).
122 478 F.2c1 at 923.
123 Id.
124 Id .
125 Id.
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change does become a public issue, however, and surveys et al. are
submitted by the applicant to support [its] proposals to change for-
mats, misrepresentations contained therein certainly become mate-
riA . 124i
It is tempting to read Lakewood as the beginning of an accommodation
between the D.C. Circuit and the Commission. By resolving the issue of mis-
representation in accordance with the philosophy of ascertainment contained
in the Commission's Primer, the court and the Commission seemed finally to
be in accord. Additionally, language in the opinion's final footnote explained
the court's self-perceived role in the entertainment format cases through
Lakewood. Taken at face value, this language was encouraging to those wishing
to settle the institutional antagonism. The court stated: "While we have recog-
nized that format changes may impair the public's paramount interest in di-
versified programming, we have never attempted to set out specific guidelines
for achieving the marketplace ideal. The first, tentative steps into this com-
plex area of regulation must be taken by the Commission." 127 Hopes for
settlement were further bolstered by similar conciliatory language in the
Commission's Primer, the agency's guide to programming issues promulgated
after the WGKA opinion.' 28
Nevertheless, the sought-after institutional settlement did not result from
these tentative accommodations. The D.C. Circuit, following the lead of
WGKA, explained that the law of entertainment. formats was still in a state of
transition: 2 " As the judicially imposed standards became more fully ex-
pounded, the institutional rift became increasingly apparent.
3. Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC: The Criteria Explained
In Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC,"" the court solidified
the law regarding entertainment formats by expounding the meaning of the
prior case law in three areas: (1) determination of when a public interest. issue
is raised in assignments—the "public grumblings" test; 131 (2) elaboration of
the financial viability standard;' 32 and (3) further definition of the meaning of
12" Id. at 924 11,9,
127 Id. at 925 n.14.
128 Primer on Ascertainment, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 680 (1971). "Suffice it to say that
any application involving a substantial change in program format including assignment
and transfer applications ... will be scrutinized in light of the IWCKA decision]; and
applicants should be prepared to support their proposals to change formats in light of
the needs and tastes of the community and the types of programming available from
other stat ions," Id. 11 680.
I" Lakewood Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v. FCC. 478 F.2d at 925 n.14.
13" 478 F2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13 ' Id. at 934. The "public grumblings" test was introduced in Progressive Rock. Upon
becoming aware of a groundswell of public dissatisfaction over a proposed format
change, the Commission is obliged to consider public sentiment in making its "public
interest' determination. Id.
132 Id. at 931. The "financial viability" of an abandoned entertainment format is a
factor to be considered by the Commission once the "public interest" is brought into
issue by the "public grumblings" test of listeners support.
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"available alternative sources."'" In Progressive Rock, the, D.C. Circuit heard,
yet again, another citizens committee appeal from an order of the FCC af-
firming a prior grant of the assignment. application."4 Twin States Broad-
casting, Inc. operated the radio station WGLN (FM) in Sylvania, Ohio—a
suburban commuter community outside Toledo. After experimenting with
two equally unsuccessful entertainment formats, Twin States sought FCC ap-
proval to assign its license to Midwestern Broadcasting Corp.'" Midwestern
proposed to change the existing golden oldies format to middle of the road
programming.'" While application for the assignment was still pending,
WGLN (FM) began experimenting with a progressive rock format. Success
with the progressive rock programming prompted the management to make a
complete change of format.' 37 On June 30, 1972, the Commission released
an order affirming the previous grant of the Twin States application.'" In-
cident to its assignment order, the FCC found that the license grant would be
in the public interest.""
A number of avid progressive rock listeners organized a citizens commit-
tee to petition the FCC for reconsideration. Despite allegations by the commit-
tee that the progressive rock format was unique to the Toledo area, and that
middle of the road programming was offered on at least six other frequen-
cies,' the Commission denied the petitioner's request for a hearing on the
issue.' 4 ' On appeal, the D.C. Circuit court reversed the Commission's order
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the Progressive
Rock opinion. 142
The Progressive Rock court. clearly articulated the threshold at which the
issue of public interest in a format. change rises to the level requiring the
Commission's resolution prior to license assignment.' 4" The court reasoned
that when a fOrmat changes, the public interest is at issue. The Commission is
required to consider all relevant factors in making its ultimate determina-
tion.' 44 The Progressive Rock court found that the public interest issue is
"3 Id. at 932. Clearly, an entertainment format cannot be considered "unique'' un-
less there are no alternative sources available to disaffected listeners.
' 34 Twin States Broadcasting, Inc., 3:' F.C.C.2d 969 (I 972).
Id. at 969.
131; id ,
37 M.
13 " Id. at 973.
139 id .
' 4 " Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir.
I973).
141 id .
142
 Id. at 934.
143 Id. at 929 n.7. The court proposed sonic guidelines on the public gumblings test.
The public interest issue is only raised if
a 'significant minority' voices support for the format to be discontinued. De
minim is non arrant arbifri, but neither may the Commission ignore a minori-
ty's petitions nor should it establish a quantitiative minimum. Each situation
is different and should be treated as such. Certainly the degree of support
for retention of a unique format can be of critical importance in what
otherwise are 'close cases.'
144 Id. at 930.
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raised during the transfer process involving the change of a unique format
"when the public grumbling reaches significant proportions." At this
point, the court explained, unresolved issues regarding the extent of support
for the format become material, "and if substantial then the proper procedure
is either a survey of the area residents or a hearing on the issue... 146
The court also made explicit two criteria for judging the public interest in
a license assignment involving a change in format: the financial viability anti
the alternative source concepts originally introduced in WGKA.' 47
 The court.
observed with dismay that its prior decision in WGKA "had become the subject
of dichotomous interpretation." 148
 Consequently, the court proceeded to ar-
ticulate these issues more fully. Addressing itself first to the financial viability
issue, the court agreed with the allegations of the citizens committee that.
there existed a legitimate dispute as to the financial viability of the en-
dangered format. 14" Despite the fact that the assignor had experienced fi-
nancial difficulties in the past with various other entertainment formats,' 5 `) in
the court's opinion those losses were not demonstrated to have been caused by
the endangered format. On the contrary, evidence before the court indicated
that the format itself was commercially successful.' 5 ' The Progressive. Rock
court clarified its financial viability criteria by focusing on the economic feasi-
bility of the format itself and not on the broadcaster's financial predicament.
As the court phrased it, "The question is not whether the licensee is in such
dire financial straits that an assignment should be granted, but whether the
format is so economically unfeasible that an assignment encompassing a format
change should be granted." 152
 The court found that the financial losses of
the licensee under prior formats would become relevant to the format change
determination by the Commission only in the event that no purchaser can be
14.5
	 at 934.
146 Id.
147
 Id. at 930.
"8 Id. at 029.
149 Id. at 931-32.
' 5" Id. at 928.
Id. at 931. The petitioners had produced affadavits from station employees at
Twin States who asserted that the progressive rock format was rapidly achieving finan-
cial viability. Industry surveys indicated a significant rise in audience gains by the sta-
tion. Additionally, the viability of the format was demonstrated by the fact that, as a
result of the format's success, the station adjusted its advertising tales up 500% and
instituted strict advertising policies. hi. The Progressive Roth court was careful to distin-
guish the economic feasibility tests used in the entertainment format cases from that
used to avoid application of the Commission's three year rule. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3507
(1979) (formerly 47 C.F.R. § 1.597(a)). The three year rule was designed to prevent
trafficking in broadcast licenses, an evil encouraged by the fact that broadcast licenses
are scarce and in high demand among broadcasters. Under the three year rule, the
assignment of a station operated by a proposed assignor for less than three years
creates a presumption of trafficking which warrants resolution in a public hearing
under section 309(e). Id. If an assignor can make an affirmative factual showing, sup-
ported by affadavits, that due to a lack of capital the proposed assignment or transfer
of control over the station would be in the public interest, the hearing requirement can
be suspended. Id.
152 478 F.2d at 931 (emphasis in original).
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found willing to program the new economically feasible format ... , and the
public is thus faced with abandonment. of the channel altogether."'" The
assignor's financial reports were dismissed as only minimally relevant to the
question of financial viability and the factual dispute was assigned for disposi-
tion at an evidentary hearing.'"
Turning to the alternative source criteria, the court made legislative
line-drawing decisions as to what comprises an entertainment format. The
Commission had based its approval of assignment upon its assertion that the
service area had two other stations which provided a similar entertainment
format.'" The assertion rested 'on the conclusion that other stations offered
top forty formats which, though not an exact duplicate of the abandoned
format, did include some progressive rock music.' 56 The court could not
find that this bare assertion by the Commission constituted a showing of the
availability of an alternative format source, and instead found that the asser-
tion had been made "in the face of contrary allegations by the appellant." '" 7
After designating this issue for a hearing, the court announced: "We deal
here with format, not occasional duplication of selections."'"
The circuit court demonstrated its dissatisfaction with the Commission's
reluctance to follow its lead set clown in WGKA. The court perceived a man-
ifestation of this reluctance in the Commission's' oral and written argument in
Lakewood and Progressive Rock. 15" The court commented that the Commis-
sion's argument for a limiting interpretation of the entertainment format law
indicated an unwillingness to encompass the judicial pronouncements of the
WGKA decision into its regulatory scheme.' 6° The growing suspicion of the
court compelled it to articulate more precisely those criteria which it asserted
must be considered by the Commission in making its public interest deter-
mination. This suspicion led the court to further remark, "not altogether
facetiously, that the Commission would be more than willing to limit the
procedural effect of [WGKA] to cases involving Atlanta classical music
stations."' 6 '
Thus, in the court's view, agency inaction in the formulation of regula-
tions amounted to a dereliction of the Commission's affirmative duty to pro-
mote the public interest. The administrative regulations envisioned by the
court in its earlier entertainment format cases were not forthcoming. In the
absence of agency rules protecting the public interest, the court returned the
record to the agency for another hard look to be made in the crucible of a
public evidentiary hearing.
13 Id. at n.14.
154 Id. of 934.
155 Twin States Broadcasting, inc., 36 F.C.C.2d 650, 652 (1972) (denial of motion to
stay order).
156 Id.
' 51 478 F.2d at 932.
156
15"
 Id. at 930.
160 Id .
la' Id.
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4. Citizens Committee to Save WEFIVI v. FCC: The Complete judicial Statement
The law regarding entertainment. formats was presented in its clearest
and most. complete form in Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC"'
(WEFM). The factual context of the case is a variation upon the theme run-
ning through the entertainment format cases. A citizens committee was or-
ganized to contest the assignment of the license to radio station WEFM (FM),
Chicago, by Zenith Radio Corporation to GCC Communications of Chicago,
Inc."3
 In its application for assignment, GCC proposed to present a con-
temporary music format and abandon the existing classical programming."'
In December, 1972, the FCC issued a memorandum opinion denying the
committee all relief and granting the assignment."'' The Commission denied
the request for a hearing, reciting as fact that the Chicago area was being
served by two other classical stations"' and that the radio station had been
suffering continuous operating losses under Zenith's ownership."' This posi-
tion was reiterated by the Commission in its denial of reconsideration" which
additionally stated its refusal to question Zenith's claimed losses since the
petitioner had alleged no facts casting doubt on them.""
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the Commission's decision and re-
manded the case to the FCC for a hearing' 7"
 on the issues of the suitability of
alternative sources, 171 the assignee's financial viability,' 72 and the misrepresen-
tation created by the assignee's survey.'" The majority opinion written by
judge McGowan contained the strongest language to date disapproving of the
Commission's "abdication of its responsibility. - ' 74 In this opinion Judge
112
 506 V.24 246 (1).C. Cir. 1974).
"3 Id. at 249.
' 64 Id.
"5 Id. at 255-56.
1 "" Zenith Radio Corp., 38 F.C.C.24 838. 839 (1972) (order of assignment).
" 7 Id. at 840-41.
1 " 11 Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223 (1973) (denial of reconsideration).
"" Id. at 230. Appended to this denial of reconsideration was an opinion entitled
"Additional Views of Chairman Burch in Which Commissioners Robert E. Lee, H. Rex
Lee, Reid, Wiley and Hook Joined - that set unit the Commissioners' underlying
analysis on which the FCC's decision in this case was based. 1d.
"" 506 F'.2d at 268.
1 " Id. at 265.
172 Id, at 266.
171 Id. In addition, the court commented on the "Additional Views" appendix, dis-
puting the Commissioners' theoretical basis for its hands-off policy in the entertain-
ment format area. Id. at 267.
174 Id. at 262 n.21. The opinion was accompanied by an elaborate discussion by
Judge hazelon on the constitutional implications of government regulation to achieve
diversity of entertainment frmats. WEFM, 506 F.24 at 268 (1Iazelon, C.J., concurring)
(a brod analysis of the traditional first amendment scheme and its relationship to FCC
regulatory policy). Additionally, Judges Robb and MacKinnon expressed thenr views in
two separate dissents to the majority. WEPAI, 506 F.2c1 at 284 (Robb, J., dissenting) (no
substantial issue of fact existed regarding the availability of an alternative source for
the proposed format to be abandoned during assignment); WEFI11, 506 F.2d at 285
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting-) (all government and judicial interference into the content
of radio broadcasts should be minimized). The WEFAI opinion indicates not only that
the institutional conflict had reached severe proportions. but also that there was grow-
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McGowan reviewed the prior case law in an effort to consolidate and synthe-
size the court's position.' 75
 The majority also undertook to describe in depth
the nature of the Commission's "affirmative obligation," claiming that the
agency's own perception of its role in these matters had been misper-
ceived. 17 " More importantly, since the Commission's opinion contained a
broad explanation of the underlying analysis upon which the FCC based its
decision, Judge McGowan took the opportunity to address the Commission's
policy arguments directly, attacking specifically the agency's reliance on it.s
policy of free competition. 177
Judge McGowan further described the Commission's resolution of the is-
,
sues as having been dictated by its own policy, rather than by its analysis of
the economic feasibility of the endangered musical format: "The Commis-
sion's resolution of this issue ... depended not on the claimed losses, but
rather on its view of its own role in cases where the format to be abandoned is
not unique." 178
 The court noted that (he Commission had decided that it
did not have to involve itself in an evidentiary hearing since the availability of
alternative formats prevented WEFM front being characterized as a unique
format.'" Nevertheless, the WEFill court clarified and broadened its notion
of the Commission's role in a license assignment. encompassing a format
change. The Commission was obligated, according to the court, to determine
whether the formai to be lost is "unique or otherwise serves a specialized audience
that would feel its loss."'"""Phi s language encompassed the rationale of Com-
missioner Johnson's dissent to (he FCC order approving the license assign-
ment. in the WEFIVI case.' "' Commissioner Johnson had argued that the el-
feet of WGKA could not be limited to those instances when a unique format
was involved, but rather the public interest consideration should depend on
whether "the effect of the proposed change [lessens] the diversity of radio
service, not necessarily the total elimination of a particular format.'' ' " ' The
effect of the court's language was to compel the Commission to assess the
impact of any format change in order to guarantee against the lessening of
diversity before granting approval of the assignment.
The WEEM court's definition of the Commission's role in making its pub-
lic interest determination resulted from the court's construction of the Com-
munications Act"" as it applies to the requirement of evidentiary hearings.
Mg dissension on the bench itself concerning the wisdom of the court's latest assertion
of power.
L7"
 Id. at 200-02. See id. at 202 for an excellent brief summarization by the court of
the teaching of the entertainment format cases,
17" Id, at 202 n. 9 1.
' 77 Id. at 267.
178 Id. at 256 (emphasis supplied).
179 Id. at 262.
1 " Id. (emphasis supplied).
' 81 See Zenith Radio Corp., 38 F,C.C.2d ar 8,18 (Johnson, C0111111'1% dissenting).
182 Id. at 850.
83 47	 § 309(d)(2) (1976) in relevant part provides:
(2) if the Commission finds on the basis of the application, the pleadings
filed, or other matters which it may officially notice that there are no sub-
stantial and material questions of fact and that a grant of the application
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The court found from the language of the act two situations that required the
FCC to hold such a hearing. That each of these situations required a hearing
appeared "clear from the face of the statute.- 184 - 1 -he first instance had been
fully elaborated in earlier decisions.'"' The court observed that it had previ-
ously found a hearing necessary when substantial and material questions are
raised by the petition to deny."" In addition, the court found that the lan-
guage of the Act required a hearing when the Commission, for any reason, is
unable to make its public interest determination."' As the WEFM court con-
cluded, "This situation might obtain with respect to a particular application
regardless of whether there are disputed fact issues as opposed to a simple
need for more information." '"" The court appeared to be clarifying its con-
ception of the Commission's role in protecting the public interest when ap-
proving license assignments. In the court's opinion, the FCC's role in deter-
mining the public interest should be more active than that of merely refuting
allegations contained in petitions to deny that the assignment is not in the
public interest. As the WEFM court. explained, "The FCC's mandate to ap-
prove applications consistent with the public interest, and only such applica-
tions, is not dependent upon the assiduousness of intervenors such as the
[citizens] Committee. An agency charged with regulation in (he public interest
cannot abdicate its responsibility, preferring for itself' the role of an umpire
between the regulated industry and public protestants."""
In summary, the WEFM definition of the Commission's role in the format
cases imposed burdens of inquiry additional to those required by Commission
policy. First, the existence of a petition to deny was no longer necessary since
"the FCC's mandate to approve applications consistent with the public interest
... is not dependent upon the assiduousness of intervenors such as the Com-
mittee."'" The Commission instead must independently consider format.
changes and their effect upon the diversity of available entertainment for-
mats. Second, the threshold at which the format change becomes affected by
the public interest because of the prior format's uniqueness had been lowered.
would be consistent with (the public interest, convicnce, or necessity), it
shall make the grant, deny the petition, and issue a concise statement of
the reasons for denying the petition, which statement shall dispose of all
substantial issues raised by the petition. If a substantial and material ques-
tion of fact is presented or if the Commission for any reason is unable to
find that grant of the application would be consistent with [the public in-
terest, convenience and necessity], it shall proceed as provided in subsec-
tion (e) of this section.
hi. (emphasis added). Subsection (e) governs the procedures for a formal evidentiary
hearing on unresolved issues of fact.
184 Id. at 259.
185 Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Lakewood Broadcasting Sere., Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cit.. 1973); Citi-
zens Comm. to Preserve WGKA v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
1 " 506 F.2d at 259.
'" Id.
188 Id.
189 WEFM, 506 F.2d at 262 n.21 (citing Office of Communications of the United
Church of Christ v, FCC, 425 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
191)
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The court-instituted sanction against the abandonment of a format which
serves a specialized audience that. would feel its loss appeared to be a much
broader sanction than that which depended merely upon the prior format's
uniqueness. This standard presumably required the Commission to affirma-
tively consider the public interest aspects of an assignment in a larger number
of cases.
In addition to requiring that the resolution of the financial viability and
misrepresentation issues take place in a hearing, the court also suggested an
examination of the suitability of a proposed substitute for the service previ-
ously offered by WEFM."' The court determined that the Commission had
not resolved the issue of the financial non-viability of WEFM's classical format.
in accordance with its public interest duty.'" The Commission had dismissed
the Citizens Committee's challenge 193 to the assignor's claim of losses because,
according to the Commission, the Committee had "neither alleged any facts
which could cast doubt on the reliability of those losses claimed by Zenith in
the operation of WEFM nor had it seriously questioned those figures." 194
The court found that this reliance on the strict pleading requirements of the
petition to deny was fundamentally unfair to the Citizens Committee.' 55 The
court noted that the Committee could not base its allegations on Zenith's fi-
nancial reports, because the FCC considered such reports to be confidential
and would not make them available to the petitioners.'" The court found
that the FCC should have used its power within the meaning of section 309(e)
of the Act 197 to assign the burden of proof respecting these losses "to the
party with access to the relevant information, viz., Zenith." 118
 Again, the
court made this determination without reconciling this provision with the
pleading requirements in the petition to deny procedures, and without ex-
amining the legislative history of the section.
Even more troubling is the manner in which the W.EFM court handled
the issue of misrepresentation raised by the petitioners. The court referred to
the applicant's ascertainment survey as a "community needs survey" with the
implication that the purpose of the survey was to elicit the community rep-
resentative's preference,'" In the opinion of the court, allegations by the
''" Id. at 264-65.
192 Id. at 265.
113
 Zenith Radio Corp., 385 F.C.C.2d 838 (1972). The Committee alleged that
Zenith's operating loss was exacerbated by its continuing to advertise its own products
on WEFM, and its failure to attempt to seek enough other advertising to make WEFM
self-supporting. Id. at 841.
1 " Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223, 225 (1973) (denial of reconsideration).
Section 309 requires that a petitioner state with specificity those facts to support an
allegation that the assignment would not be in the public interest. 47 §
309(d)(1) (1976).
1 "' 506 F.2d at 265.
n
117
 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1976) states in relevant part: "['The burden of proof shall be
on the applicant, except that with respect to any issue presented by petition to deny
. • such burdens shall be as determined by the Commission." Id.
HI S 506 F.2d at 266.
199 Id.
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Committee that the applicant had misled the interviewers concerning the na-
ture of the format change cast "some doubt on the bona fides of [the appli-
cant's] representation." 200 In light of the circuit court's disposition of the
misrepresentation issue in Lakewood, it is difficult to determine how the al-
leged misrepresentations raised a material issue of fact. In Lakewood, the court
had found evidence of similar misrepresentations to be immaterial since the
petitioner's allegations were based on a misreading of the purposes of the
ascertainment procedures."' The Lakewood court had expressed approval of
the policy behind the ascertainment procedure, arguing that since the proce-
dure was not intended to determine the community's preferences, any failure
to inform the interviewees as to the pm -pose of the interviews was not mate-
ria1. 202 The Commission had specifically changed the language in its Pro-
gramming Inquiry, 21" requiring an applicant to survey the community needs
to that used in the Commission's Primer. 204 The Primer used the word
"problems" to define the specific purpose of the ascertainment. procedure.
Quoting the Primer: "[O]ur experience has shown that a large segment of the
broadcast industry has steadfastly interpreted community 'needs' to mean pref-
erences.... Therefore, ... we sought in preparing the Primer to use a new
word to emphasize our intent: hence, 'problems.' " 21)5 It is difficult to per-
ceive how the court, having Found itself in unison with the stated purposes of
the ascertainment. procedure and the underlying Commission policy, could
find allegations of fact. raised by the Committee's petition to deny in the in-
stant. case material to the Commission's disposition of the assignment decision.
After having reviewed the prior case law on the subject and having re-
manded the application for assignment for a healing on the issues raised by
the petitioner, the WEFiVI court took the opportunity to discuss the Commis-
sion's policy which constituted the underlying analysis on which the FCC's
decision in the case was based. 21" The Commission's policy on format choice
appeared in the appendix to its opinion on reconsideration, entitled "Addi-
tional Views of Chairman Burch, " 2 " 7 in which Chairman Burch quoted the
Supreme Court opinion in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station 2" for the
proposition that the Communications Act "recognizes that the field of broad-
casting is one of free competion. -21i' FCC policy, according to the Commis-
sioners, was the result of striking the "balance between the preservation of a
free competitive broadcast system, on the one hand, and the reasonable re-
striction of that freedom inherent in the public interest standard provided in
2" Id.
21" 478 F.2c1 at 923.
21'2
 Id. at 923-24.
21 ' Report and Statement of Policy re: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry,
25 Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960).
2"4 Miller on the Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971),
21'2 Id. at 656,
2 "" 506 F.2d at 266-68.
217 40 F.C,C.2d 223, 230 (1973).
2" 399 U.S. 47(1 (1940).
21"' Id. at 474,
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the Communications Act, on the other." 210 The Commission argued in the
appendix that the balance had been struck when the Commission required
regulation of the broadcaster's non-entertainment programming through the
ascertainment procedure and advocated permitting the licensee wide discre-
tion in the content of his entertainment format. This latitude, the Commission
maintained, ensured diversity without government regulation because
economic forces would fill in any void created by the abandonment of a viable
radio format. 2 " The majority of the WEFM court. found it curious that the
Commission had struck the balance by placing "entertainment programming
in one pan and everything else in the other." 212
The IVILTM decision attacked the Commission's policy of free competition
on statutory grounds. The court reasoned that. the public interest mandate
frequently conflicted with the policy of leaving regulation to marketplace
forces to produce diversity. Although the circuit court in WEFM quoted the
Supreme Court to justify its position, 2 " the real justification soon became ap-
parent. The court postulated: "There is, in the familiar sense, no free market
in radio entertainment because over-the-air broadcasters do not deal directly
with their listeners. They derive their revenue from the sale of advertising
time." 214 The court concluded from this that broadcasters driven only by the
profit motive would seek to maximize profits by appealing to those audiences
with the largest disposable income, such as young adults, leaving other seg-
ments of society without a radio station of their preference. 215
 According to
the court, this policy of "mechanistic deference to competition" 2 " does not.
ensure that the assignment decisions would be made in the public interest of
"securing the maximum benefits of radio to all people of the United
States."'
The positions of the D.C. Circuit court and the Commission began to
emerge as polar opposites with no potential for reconciliation and no indica-
tion that either of these two institutions would back down. After the WEFM
decision, the outlines of the conflict were sharply defined. The Commission
had explained its reasons for maintaining the same response to petitioner's
claims despite almost certain reversal by the court. The Commission believed
that these reasc.ms framed an issue which transcended the narrow fact situa-
tions of the individual cases and, therefore, addressed the underlying
2 " 40 F.C.C.2d at 230.
2 " Id. at 231.
212 506 F.2d at 267. It seemed inconsistent to the court that the Commission had
relied upon the broadcaster's first amendment rights lin- justification of its policy of
non-interference in entertainment programming. The court thought that the "familiar
First Amendment concepts would indicate a lesser—not a greater—governmental role"
in non-entertainment programming. Id.
2 " Id. at 267 (quoting FCC v R.C.A. Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 93 (1953)).
"The very fact that Congress has seen fit to enter into the comprehensive regulation of
communication embodied in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 contradicts the
notion that national policy unqualifiedly favors competition in Communications." Id.
214 506 F.2(1 at 269.
2111 Id.
217 ht
1098	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:1067
rationale that had dictated its response in each of the format cases. That
rationale, restated briefly, was that the marketplace is the best mechanism for
assuring diversity of entertainment. formats. The Commission had stated its
belief that any void created by the abandonment of a financially viable pro-
gramming format would be quickly filled by the broadcasters themselves. The
court, on the other hand, in articulating the law regarding format changes,
had dismissed the Commission's policy as an abdication of its statutory duty, a
characterization it felt competent to make as the agency's reviewing court.
The court and the Commission were thus engaged in a level of discourse
beyond the narrow contexts of the individual cases. Instead, the issue had
evolved into a struggle between judge and administrator over the proper allo-
cation of discretion and authority.
B. Policy Regarding Entertainment Formats: The FCC Rulemaking Response
One year after the D.C. Circuit court denied a rehearing of the WEFM
case, the FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry,'" a preliminary to its notice and
comment rulemaking procedure.'" The regulatory scheme outlined in
WEFM was so contrary to the Commission's own policy regarding entertain-
ment formats that it attempted to have the court reconsider its position based
upon a complete exposition of the Commission's arguments. The Commission
perceived that the limitations placed on its regulatory function by the Com-
munications Act 22 ° and the Constitution precluded reconciliation with the ju-
dicial position laid down in WEFM. 221 The Commission attempted a more
complete statement of . its policy of non-interference in entertainment pro-
gramming than that which had appeared in the appendix to its license decision
in WEFM. In so doing the Commission was cognizant of the institutional rela-
tionship between the court and the agency; even though "partners," the
Commission lacked the authority to overrule or to avoid a court of appeals
mandate.'" Consequently, as the Commission explained, the agency did not
mean to obviate the court's mandate in WEFM. The purpose of the policy
statement was "simply to apprise the Court of the fact that, after a thorough
reconsideration of the issues concerning changes in entertainment formats,
[the Commission was] firmly convinced that the regulatory policy outlined in
WEFM represented a serious departure from the policies which we believe are
required by the Communications.Act and the First Amendment."'" The
Commission responded to the notion of the court-agency partnership in
furtherance of the public interest and noted that, when partners come to a
point of Fundamental disagreement, each partner must carefully scrutinize his
position "if the relationship is to be creative rather than destructive." 224
21" Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast
Stations, 57 F.C.C.2d 580 (1975) (Notice of Inquiry).
21 " 47 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
22 ' ) 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
221 57 F.C.C.2d at 582-83.
222 Entertainment Policy Statement, 66 F.C.C.2d 78 (1977) (Denial of Reconsidera-
tion).
223 Id. at 79.
224 Entertainment Policy Statement, (30 F.C.C.2d 836, 865 (1976) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order).
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In order to compile supporting data for its policy statement, the Commis-
sion delineated two important questions on which it. solicited reasoned com-
ment by interested parties: (1) whether the Communications Act's public in-
terest standard required close scrutiny of entertainment formats to achieve
diversity, and (2) whether the first amendment permitted this close scrutiny of
program content. 22 ' The Commission was concerned that a "system of per-
vasive governmental regulation" 22" rejecting broadcaster programming choice
would have an adverse effect. on the public interest by eliminating the proper
function of marketplace forces. 227
The Commission initiated its discussion of the Communications Act pub-
lic interest standard by comparing it with the standard used in common car-
rier regulation. The Commission pointed out that the congressional history
indicated that the legislators purposely intended to keep the domains of radio
broadcasting and common carriage distinct. 228
 The two features of common
carriage which distinguish it from broadcast regulation are (1) the duty to
furnish "communications service upon reasonable request ... ," 229
 and (2)
the requirement of Commission authority to commence or discontinue COM-
munications service.'" The Commission argued that neither of these types
of regulation were incorporated into broadcast regulation of the airwaves."'
The Commission went on to say that in recent years the D.C. Circuit
court had attempted to impose "common-carrier-like" obligations upon broad-
cast licensees by straining the meaning of the public interest standard or the
Constitution to require them.232
 In contrast to the common carrier's obliga-
tion to continue service, the Commission argued that the Communications Act
"recognizes that broadcasters are not common carriers and are not to he dealt
with as such. Thus the Act recognizes that the field of broadcasting is one of
free competition." 233
 Commission applied this analysis to the entertain-
ment format context to reach the conclusion that free competition was the
policy through which Congress intended to regulate the selection and diver-
sity of formats.
22-' Entertainment. Policy Statement, 57 F.C.C.2d at 582.
224i Entertainment Policy Statement, 60 F.C.C.2d at 858.
227
 Id. at 863.
229 Id. at 863 (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94. 103-09 (1973)).
22" See 47 U.S.C.	 201(a) (1976).
230
 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976).
211
 60 F.C.C.2c1 at 859.
2"2
 Entertainment Policy Statement, 60 F.C.C.2d at 859-60. The Commission dis-
cussed the D.C. Circuit court's decision in Bus. iness Executives for Vietnam Peace v.
FCC. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and its later reversal sub nom. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 n.203 (1973). The Business
Executives court held that a broadcast licensee's policy of refusing to accept paid an-
nouncements concerning controversial matters of public importance violated both the
public interest mandate of the Communications Act and the first amendment, 450
F.2d at 660. This right of public access was rejected by the Supreme Court which held
that it was Congress's "intent and manifest desire to preserve values of private jour-
nalism under a regulatory scheme which would insure fulfillment of •certain public
obligations." 412 U.S. at 109.
23"
 60 F.C.C.2d at 860 (quoting FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470, 474 (1940)).
1100	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 21:1067
The Commission buttressed its policy argument with empirical data con-
tained in Appendix B,234 attached to the Statement. of Policy, which it claimed
decisively demonstrated how effective the tool of competition has been in car-
rying out Congress' plan for entertainment programming. This statistical
study attempted to demonstrate the fallacy in the court of appeals position by
attacking its assumptions that audiences discriminate among various enter-
tainment formats and that maximizing format diversity would promote lis-
tener satisfaction. 2  The study attempted to demonstrate empirically that
audience shares of radio markets tend to differ nearly as much within the
same format as they do between stations broadcasting markedly different
programs. 2"" The apparent. inference from the study is that promoting di-
versity of program formats could be counterproductive to fostering the satis-
faction and welfare of the consuming public, because government mandated
restrictions on format changes in accordance with WEFM would have no cor-
relation with the casual manner in which listeners make their preference
selections. 237 The ultimate conclusion reached by the FCC was that a system
of regulation fashioned along the lines of WEFM would not be compatible
with the agency's public interest mandate. 238
The Commission pointed to several practical problems involved in ad-
ministering the WEFM regulations. According to the Commission every time
an assignment involves a prospective format change, WEFM compels the
Commission to determine first, what the existing format is, second, whether
there are any reasonable substitutes for that format in the service area, and
finally, if there are none, whether the benefits accruing to the public from the
format change outweigh the public detriment which the format's abandon-
ment would entail. 2"" The Commission expressed its concern over the sub-
stantial line-drawing problems in an area open to obviously subjective dis-
criminations.' 40 As the Commission stated, the elusive qualities of a stat.ion's
programming seem to make all broadcast formats equally unique. 24 ' The
Commission quoted Commissioner Robinson's observations in his concurring
statement in the Policy Statement's Notice of Inquiry:242 “Wh at ma kes one
format unique makes all formats unique .... Questions of pacing and style,
the personalities of on-the-air talent (both individually and in combination
with one another) all contribute to those fugitive values that radio people call
a station's 'sound' and that citizen's groups (and alas, appellate judges) call
format." 243
2"4 60 F.C.C.2d al 872-81.
2" '" Entertainment Policy Statement, 60 F.C.C1,2c1 at 861.
22" Id. at 863.
237 Id. at 863-64.
2.371 Id. at 864.
23" Id. at 861-62.
24" Id. at 862.
241 ird.
242 Id. (quoting Entertainment Policy Statement, 57 F.C.C1.2(1 580, 595 (1976) (con-
curring statement)).
243 Id.
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The conclusions in the Policy Statement reiterate the Commission's faith
in the ability of the market system to promote diversity. In addition to its own
empirical study, the Commission pointed to the situations of several "large
markets, with many aural services and intense competition" as further proof'
that market allocation produces "an almost bewildering array of 'diversity' "
among entertainment formats.' In summary, the Commission concluded
that after careful re-evaluation of its position, including a supporting empiri-
cal study, it was justified in persisting in its policy of free competition. The
Commission determined that a regulatory scheme similar to the one proposed
by the D.C. Circuit in WEE/11 "would be flatly inconsistent with our under-
standing of congressional policy as manifested in the Communications Act,
counterproductive in terms of maximizing the welfare of the listening public,
administratively a fearful and comprehensive nightmare, and unconstitutional
as impermissibly chilling innovation and experimentation in radio program-
ming." 245
 The Policy Statement purports to be a complete re-evaluation of
the Commission's policy and, since the effectiveness of the Commission's
order was stayed pending judicial review of the order, the agency awaited the
court's own re-evaluation in return
C. WNCN Listener's Guild: The Judicial Retrenchment
As the opinion of Judge Leventhal in WNCN Listener's Guild v. FCC 247
indicates, the mutuality,
 of respect and understanding upon which the court-
agency partnership depends has finally felt the strains of a decade-long in-
stitutional antagonism. In WNCN Listener's Guild, the decision reviewing the
Commission's order, the tenor of the judicial language suggests that the
court-agency partnership in the public interest has deteriorated badly. In his
concurring opinion, Judge Leventhal, architect of the partnership concept.,
revealed that the majority of that federal bench viewed the agency's pro-
cedural attempt with considerable consternation. judge Leventhal charac-
terized the agency attempt as having been prompted by its hostility to the
court's result in the WEFM case which has led the FCC to distort the meaning
of its WEF/11
Despite the Commission's statement of purpose to the contrary,'" Judge
McGowan characterized the FCC Statement. of Policy as an attempt to over-
rule WEFM through the Commission's rulemaking process.'" The court was
obviously affronted by what it viewed as the FCC's attempt. at "circumvention
of a recent court decision in an adjudicatory context." 251 In judge McGow-
an's opinion, the FCC's commitment to licensee discretion had resulted in its
opposition to the D.C. Circuit's decisions throughout. the format. controversy.
2" Entertainment Policy Statement, 60 F.C.C.2d at 863.
24 Id. at
 865_66 .
246 /d. at 866.
247
 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
24H WNCN Lisitener's Guild, 610 F.2d al 859 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
24" 66 F.C.C.2d 78, 79 (1977) (denial of reconsideration).
25" W/VCN Listener's Guild, 610 F.2d at 850.
251 Id.
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This opposition had led the Commission to misinterpret and exaggerate the
meanings of the court's decisions. 2 ' 2
To prevent this misinterpretation, the WNCN court again attempted to
articulate the analytical framework of its format decisions. 25 " After restating
the Com ► ission's repudiation of the 117EF/11 regulatory scheme, the court
criticized the FCC statement that it had impartially reexamined the issue
raised by WEE/W. 2' In the mind of the court, the FCC's reliance on its "pre-
viously undisclosed - staff study, Appendix B, and the administrative night-
mare argument created "serious doubts on the rationality and impartiality" of
the FCC's actions.'"
The court maintained that, in view of the weight given Appendix B, the
FCC should have released the study results for adversarial testing. 25" The
court stated that the Commission's failure to disclose the results of the study
had raised serious doubts about both the accuracy of the agency's decision
and its procedural fairness.'''' In the court's opinion, the administrative
nightmare argument used by the Commission 258 was "little more than a
dream. -25" The court made an examination of the actual burdens which the
administration of the format change law had imposed upon the Commission
since WGKA, and concluded that in the ten years of administration "a mere
handful of format changes cases have reached this court."'" As determined
from the response of the Commission counsel at oral argument, the future
burden also appeared to be relatively insignificant."" The court termed the
reliance of the Commission on the floodgate argument—"to the point of al-
most frenzied rhetorical excess" 2 " 2 —to have diminished the credibility of the
agency's argument in light of the actual facts."
The court of appeals preceded its discussion of the arguments which the
Commission made in its Policy Statement with the observation that the FCC's
aversion to the court's decisions had perpetuated its misunderstanding and
exaggeration of their meanings.'" The court thought it significant that the
FCC had never sua spank initiated a hearing in a format case,' that the FCC
2 " Id. at 849.
25.3
	 at 842-43.
254 Id. at 846.
255 Id.
255 Id.
257 Id. The court noted various factors which indicated that t he Commission had
acted in a manifestly' unfair manner: (1) that it took a Freedom of Information request
to obtain data; (2) that the Commission did not indicate its plans to rely on the staff
study in its decision; (3). that the computer worksheets finally delivered were obscure
and incomprehensible to the readers without a key; and (4) that the Commission had
failed in good faith to send the key to all petitioners. Id. at 847.
258 60 F.C.C.2d at 864, 865,
zmr WNGN Listener's Guild, 610 F.2(1 at 848.
ern
2" Id. at 849.
252 Id .
252 Id.
2H4 far.
25 Id. at 849-50.
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had repeatedly argued for the court to reverse or curtail its decisions,'" and
that it had attempted to "overrule" the WEFM decision through its rulemak-
ing procedure. 21 ' 7
 The court indicated that it thought these activities created
a pattern of behavior in the Commission which demonstrated its commitment
to licensee discretion. 2 " 8
 The court dismissed the administrative burden ar-
gument by indicating that it was the Commission's own misreading of the
format cases which had led it to conclude that the court was imposing a sys-
tem of pervasive government regulation on the broadcast industry.'" The
court admitted, however, that in the majority of cases no public interest issue
affected a license transfer, and that the Commission was called upon to pro-
tect the public by promoting diversity of formats only in those instances where
strong prima facie evidence demonstrated that the market had broken
down."" The court concluded that those instances in which a hearing was
required on this issue were rare. 27 ' The court also concluded that WEFM did
not intrude unconstitutionally or beyond the drafter's intent into licensee
programming discretion, since there was no evidence that WEFM had in fact
deterred the licensee's format choices.'" Its emphasis on the limitation of
the Commission's remedial powers '273
 led the court to reject the agency's cen-
sorship and common carrier arguments. In summary, the court of appeals
looked to the Commission to develop those administrative standards to im-
plement the law set down in the entertainment cases so as "to minimize their
drawbacks while preserving their essence."'
The partnership reference made in the Commission's Policy Statement 275
gave the court the opportunity to comment briefly on what it perceived to be
the proper institutional relationship between the FCC and the court of ap-
peals. The court took umbrage at the Commission's suggestion that the fun-
damental conflict surrounding their separate policies required the court to
reexamine its policy.Y'" The court set the tone of its discussion of the institu-
tional relationship by stating "we should have thought that WEFM represents,
not a police, but rather the law of the land as enacted by Congress and inter-
preted by the Court of Appeals, and as it is to be administered by the Corn-
20"
 Id. at 850.
267 Id.
2 " Id. at 849.
2" Id. at 850.
27"
 Id. at 851. The court reiterated the teaching of' the format cases that no public
interest issue arose if: (1) an adequate substitute existed in the service area for the
abandoned format; (2) no substantial support for the endangered format was shown
by way of significant public grumblings; (3) devotees of the endangered format arc too
few to be served by the available frequencies, and (4) the fOrmat itself was not finan-
cially viable. Id.
271 mt.
272 Id.
273 Id. The court emphasized that the FCC cannot interfere with a licensee's pro-
gramming choices since it lacked the power (1) to retrain the broadcast of any pro-
gram; (2) to dictate the adoption of a new format; (3) to force the retention of an
existing format; and (4) to command provision of access to non-licensees. Id. at 851-52.
274 Id. at 852.
2"
 (10 F.C.C.2d at 865.
27"
 WNCN Listener's Guild, 610 F.2d at 854.
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mission. - 277 The court confessed to its lack of expertise and constitutional
authority to make policy, and asserted that this legislative, line-drawing func-
tion had been delegated to the agency by the Congress.' Nevertheless, the
court expressed emphatically that as far as interpretation of the law was con-
cerned, the court reserved sole and final constitutional authority to do so. 27 "
The court concluded: "fAllthough the distinction between law and policy is
never clear-cut, it is nonetheless a touchstone of the proper relation between
court and agency that we ignore at our peril. - 2" The superior authority of
the law asserted by (he D.C. Circuit. pitched the balance of the court-agency
partnership so that court emerged as senior partner.
M. ANALYSIS
The institutional antagonism revealed in the entertainment fc.wrnat cases
has focused primarily on the question of materiality as applied to (he hearing
requirement 281 of the section 309 petition to deny. 282 Throughtom the con-
troversy, the FCC and the D.C. Circuit have perceived materiality differently.
The Commission consistently maintained that the petitioners failed to raise
material issues of Fact, thus permitting the FCC to approve the license trans-
fer without a formal hearing. The Commission's perception of materiality has
been colored by its own laissez faire policy regarding entertainment pro-
gramming. The Commission has maintained that, since the public interest in
diversity of entertainment formats is best served by the interaction of market
forces, a petition to deny alleging only a loss of a unique fOrmat cannot pre-
sent issues of fact material to its public interest determination. The D.C. Cir-
cuit has taken the opposite position. By defining public interest to include a
public right to diverse entertainment programming, the court found that.
material facts had been raised by the petition and remanded each case for a
hearing on the issues as it framed them.
Throughout the controversy, the D.C. Circuit has attempted to assure
itself that the FCC's determinations turn upon a consideration of public wants
and not merely upon the economic interests of the broadcasting parties. 28 "
The D.C. Circuit court decisions in the entertainment format area have at-
tempted to promote the public's entertainment preferences by compelling
broadcasters to program accordingly. Nevertheless, the court's influence on
the programming judgments of broadcaster's has been confined to the hand-
ful of cases before it. The Commission has failed to promulgate regulations
reflecting the D.C. Circuit decisions which would have given the court's pro-
nouncements greater effect. Additionally, the changes in program format
277 Id.
275
27" Id. at 854-55.
28" Id. at 855.
281 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1976) prescribes the formal hearing procedures incident to
the determination of unresolved issues of fact during license grant including license
assignnients.
2 " 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1976). See note 34 supra for text of § 309(d) (materiality re-
quirements for a formal hearing).
2 '1" See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text.
July 1980]	 ENTERTAINMENT FORMATS	 1105
which have occurred have not resulted from hearings ordered by the court.
Rather, all but one of (he format cases were resolved before an FCC hearing,
with the petitioning public and the broadcasters reaching a negotiated settle-
ment.'" The public's preferences were integrated into the license assignee's
programming not as a result of (he inherent persuasiveness of the court's
logic, but rather from the coercion created by the prospects of a court-
ordered formal administrative hearing."'
While some may view the attempts of the D.C. Circuit to increase public
input into the FCC's public interest determinations as laudable, the court's use
of' the hard look and partnership doctrines to lower the procedural barriers
imposed by section 309 of the Communications Act appears to run afoul of
explicit congressional intent." 8" Legislative history indicates that the strict
pleading requirements of section 309 were purposely imposed by Congress to
avoid warrantless demands upon the Commission's energies created by un-
necessary Ilea rings.287 House Report No. 1800 accompanying the 1960
amendment to the Communications Act indicates that a prior amendment to
section 309 had proscribed FCC hearing procedures which "in all instances
[have] proved to be cumbersome, time consuming, and in many cases of no
value whatsoever."'-'c" The report indicates that the former protest proce-
dure, permitting a party in interest to challenge the Commission's action when
it had granted a license without a hearing, had been abused. 28  Formerly,
protests deemed to be factually sufficient by the Commission were designated
for a hearing upon issues relating to all matters specified in the petition as
grounds for setting aside the grant. The report noted that "[Ole provisions of
this subsection have been broadly interpreted by the colt rts 2 "" and have
proved to he a most effective device for delaying the disposition of Commis-
sion business... 2 " The new pre-grant procedure embodied in the present
version of section 309 attempted to limit the number of cases in which a hear-
ing was required, in a direct response to judicial attempts to expand the in-
stances in which a hearing was necessary.= " 2
284 VIINGN Listener's Guild, 610 F.2c1 at 848-49.
2" See Policy Statement re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast
Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 864-65 (1970), for a description of the administrative bur-
den and expense of" a hearing on remand froth a court's fmrniat decision.
28 " See Note, Judicial Review of FCC Program Diversity Regulation, 75 Coi.um. L. REv.
401 (1975). The author suggests that the strict standard of judicial review and the
hard look doctrine "compensates in part for the procedural difficulties imposed by
section 309. - Id. at 408.
2" H.R. Rip. No. 1800, reprinted in [1960] U.S. Cont•: CoNG. & AD. News 3516.
2" Id. at 3517.
2" ' '
21 " Since the 1960 amendment there has been judicial expansion of the party in
interest standing requirement of section 309(d) to include responsible members of the
listening public. Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (1966). Prior to United Church of Christ, economic injury and electrical inter-
ference were the exclusive grounds for standing to intervene in proceedings before the
Commission, Id. at 100.
2 " H.R. REP. No. 1800, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE. CAN:. & AD. News 3517.
292 Id. The legislative history indicated that the old protest procedure required the
protestant to demonstrate only -such allegations of fact as will show the protestant to
be a party in interest and should specify with particularity the facts relied upon by the
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The legislative history indicates that the new materiality pleading re-
quirement. was implemented "to afford the Commission an opportunity to
dispose of those petitions which were of no real consequence by brief orders
Or opinions as the circumstances may warrant without the necessity for a for-
mal hearing.- 2113 The petition to deny as presently formulated will be set
clown for a hearing only if substantial and material questions of fact presented
by the assignment application and the petition remain unresolved prior to
granting the license. 214 By imposing the added requirements of materiality
and substantiality, Congress augmented the Commission's discretion to decide
matters involving the public interest incident to license grants without the
procedural but -dens of a formal administrative hearing."' A House commit-
tee member pointed out that "the committee expects that the Commission will
use any procedural device available to it. to expedite its business,'" evidenc-
ing congressional intent for the liberal use of the materiality barrier by the
FCC in the interest of promoting administrative efficiency.
Throughout the format cases, the D.C. Circuit bypassed the procedural
barriers of the petition to deny by redefining materiality in terms of what it
considered Commission policy should be regarding entertainment program
diversity. The court in WGKA made a broad assumption regarding the con-
gressional intent behind the Communications Act with respect to the public
interest in diversity of entertainment formats. The court determined in
WGKA that "it is surely in the public interest, as that was conceived by a Congress
representative of all the people, for all major aspects of contemporary culture to
be accommodated by the commonly-owned public resources." 257 Once the
court established this paramount public right to diversity in entertainment
formats in WGKA, the court formulated a set of substantive criteria—financial
viability of format, assignee misrepresentation, and alternative source of
protestant as showing that the grant was improperly made. - Id. Under the 1960
amendment., the new procedure requires the Commission to designate a license appli-
cation for a heating "where upon an examination of the application and the petition to
deny or any other pleadings before it, the Commission is not able to make the public
interest findings requited." Id. at 3518. These new procedures were specifically de-
signed to avoid "the abuses which are inherent in the present procedure." Id.
2" H.R. REP. No. 1800, reprinted in [1960] U.S. Cone. Com:. & An. NEWS 3516,
3520.
214 H.R. REP. No. 1800 defines "material question of fact" for purposes of section
309(d) and (c) to be "a question of fact which is material to determination of the
question whether the public interest, convenience, or necessity would be served by the
granting of the application with respect to which such question is raised." Id.
2"5 The 1952 version of the pre-grant procedure required the Commission to set the
petition down for a hearing in all instances after having reviewed the petition for
factual sufficiency. 47 U.S.C. 309(c) (1952). The 1960 amended version currently en-
forced requires a hearing only when the Commission determines that material and
substantial questions of fact remain prior to the grant. 47 U.S.C. 309(d) (1976). The
Commission's discretion is englarged in these instances since it is incumbent. upon the
Commission to decide whether facts remaining are material or substantial to the reso-
lution of the public interest determination.
21 " Id. at 3521.
217 Citizens Comm. to Preserve WGKA v. FCC, 436 17.2c1 263, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(emphasis supplied).
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programming—at variance with FCC policy. In the court's analysis, the fail-
ure on the part of the Commission to consider these criteria protecting that
public right resulted in a record which revealed unresolved material issues of
fact. The court, therefore, compelled the Commission to consider these issues
in the context. of a !Orilla] administrative hearing in order to fulfill the public
interest mandate.
Although the courts analysis was couched in terms of assuring the pro-
cedural adequacy and rationality of the Commission's decisions, the court im-
ported its own substantive values into this area of FCC entertainment policy.
The collaborative dialogue with the Commission under the partnership doc-
trine allowed the court to define those material issues which it considered
necessary for the agency's public interest determination. By imposing its ver-
sion of materiality on the FCC and compelling the Commission to decide the
public interest in accordance with its own notions, the court substituted its
judgment for that of the Commission, effectively overruling the agency's pol-
icy. In light of the specific legislative history behind the petition to deny and
the more general congressional intent of Congress through the Communica-
tions Act to repose a high degree of substantive discretion in the Commis-
sion,"-''" the entertainment format cases do not comport with the congressional
vision of the proper institutional relationship between the Commission and
the D.C. Circuit.
Neither the D.C. Circuit nor the FCC appear to have capitualated in
their respective positions regarding regulation to promote entertainment for-
mat diversity. After ten years of controversy, the FCC has not waivered in its
policy of allowing competition and marketplace forces to create the desired
format diversity. The D.C. Circuit has remained unpersuaded by the Commis-
sion arguments that regulation in this area is incompatible with FCC interpre-
tations of the Communications Act, impermissible in terms of the broadcast-
er's first amendment right, and impossible in terms of agency administration
Throughout the format cases, the D.C. Circuit has found Commission deci-
sions regarding unique formats which are unreflective of the public's
paramount right to diversity in entertainment to have exhibited danger signs
of irrational decisionmaking. These positions have solidified as evidenced by
the Commission's policy statement. on entertainment formats written in re-
sponse to the court's WEEM opinion 2"" and by the court's partnership analysis
of the institutional relationship between the D.C. Circuit and the Commission
in WNCN Listener's Guild . 3" The court's position in WNCN Listener's Guild
2" The court has repeatedly recognized the institutional relationship as designed by
Congress: "Admittedly, the scope of our review is quite narrow; we defer to the exper-
tise and experience of the Commission within its field of specialty and would reverse
only where the Commission's position is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." West
Michigan Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 396 F.2d 688, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Sayger v. FCC,
312 F.2d 352, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("The delicate balance in the public interest to he
achieved by the assignment of radio frequencies is a matter committed to the expertise
of the Commission."). See also Folkways Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 375 F.2d 299, 305
(D.C. Cir. 1967) ("Undue interference by the court is itself contrary to the public in-
terest.").
2"" See note 245 supra and accompanying text.
"" See notes 275-80 supra and accompanying text.
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reaffirmed its partnership doctrine relegating questions of law to itself and
questions of policy to the Commission. By fOrmulafing the controlling criteria
for the Commission's decision in the entertainment format area and by impos-
ing them on the Commission, however, the court has created substantive pol-
icy which offends Commission discretion. Since this antagonism does not ap-
pear to be reconcilable by (he two institutions themselves, the controversy will
have to be resolved by it decision of the Supreme Court. Ordering the respec-
tive spheres of institutional competence between the D.C. Circuit and the
Commission will necessarily affect the cou rt's current collaborative role in
FCC policymaking as has been developed through the partnership doctrine.
The National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting"' case is highly suggestive
of the Supreme Court's inclination to dispose of this matter. As previously
noted, in NCCB, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's conclusion
that the Commission policy to "grandfather" its new multiple ownership rule
regarding newspaper-broadcast combinations had been arbitrary and capri-
cious. The NCCB case indicates that the Supreme Court is willing to uphold
Commission discretion in a parallel area of controversy in (he field of tele-
communications regulations. The conclusion that the Supreme Court would
re-affirm -the Commission's discretion in the area of entertainment policy ap-
pears inevitable. The institutional ramifications of the NCCB case with regard
to the D.C. Circuit's partnership doctrine have been noted by Judge Bazelon
in his concurrence in WNCN Listener's Guild, the latest D.C. Circuit decision in
the entertainment format area. Judge Bazelon noted that "FP' we arc directed
to defer to the FCC's decision in NCCB, which seemed clearly at odds with the
FCC's (public interest) mandate, surely we should be hesitant here, where the
Commission's accommodation of the conflicting policy interests is neither
wholly irrational nor wholly contrary to the purposes of the Communications
Act."" 12 The NCCB case may indicate that if the Supreme Court. can find a
rational basis for the Commission's definition of materiality, the Commission's
discretion will be upheld. The fad that Congress had purposely intended the
Commission to use the procedural device of materiality to screen warrantless
claims implies that the Supreme Court will have little difficulity in upholding
agency discretion in this area, effectively overruling (he D.C. Circuit's partner-
ship doctrine as it relates to entertainment policy.
In the context of administrative law, a Supreme Court decision re-
affirming Commission discretion to define the substantive content of the
"public interest." standard appears correct. The majority opinions in the for-
mat cases were written as statutory review proceedings focusing on the proper
statutory interpretation of the Communications Act public interest mandate.
By re-affirming the agency's discretion to define administrative policies in ful-
filling its statutory mandate, the Court would be . acting in accordance with
Congress' vision of the proper institutional relationship between the agency
and its reviewing court..
30" 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
3112 1.11NCiV Listener's Guild, 610 F.2d at 858-59 ri.4 (Bazelon, C.j., concurring in vaca-
tion of the decision).
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CONCLUSION
The institutional controversy between the FCC and the D.C. Circuit over
regulation to promote diversity of entertainment programming has proved to
be persistent and obdurate. The differences between the court and the Com-
mission as to the proper definition of the public interest with regard t.o for-
mat diversity have revealed an underlying institutional rift. between law and
policy. The court's decisions are incompatible with the FCC's wide discretion
in administering policies that will promote the public interest in diversity. As
long as the FCC fails to promulgate regulations to promote entertainment
format diversity, the D.C. Circuit will rule that the Commission has acted in-
consistently with its public interest mandate.
The court's hard look and partnership clod rines employed in the format
cases to overrule Commission policy demonstrate a marked departure from
the court's traditionally deferential attitude toward the FCC. Owing to the
persistence of this controversy and the inflexibility of the respective positions
of the two institutions as evidenced by recent polio' retrenchment, the Su-
preme Court may have to impose an authoritative resolution by drawing a
line defining the spheres of discretion belonging to each institution. The more
likely alternative is that the Supreme Court will look to the intent of Congress
in drafting the Communications Act and resolve the current controversy by
re-affirming FCC discretion in these matters.
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